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Abstract
Little is known about the price sensitivity of demand for home care of the
disabled elderly. We partially fill this knowledge gap by using administrative
data on the beneficiaries of the main French home care subsidy program in a
department and exploiting inter—individual variation in provider prices. We
address the potential endogeneity of prices by taking advantage of the unequal
spatial coverage of providers and instrumenting price by the number of mu-
nicipalities served by a provider. We estimate a price elasticity of around -0.4
that is significantly different from both 0 and -1. This less than proportionate
response of consumption to price has implications for the efficiency and redis-
tributive impact of variation in the level of co-payments in home care subsidy
schemes.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Like most developed countries, France is facing the ageing of its population:
due to the increase in life expectancy and the advance in age of baby-boomers,
the share of the population above 75 is predicted to grow from 9.0% in 2013 to
17.2% in 2060 (Blanpain and Buisson, 2016). As the rise in disability-free life
expectancy falls short of the increase in life expectancy (Sieurin et al., 2011),
the number of the elderly needing assistance to perform the activities of daily
living is expected to grow substantially. Most disabled elderly keep on liv-
ing in the community rather than entering specialized institutions (Colombo
et al., 2011). Besides medical and nursing care, they are often provided with
domestic help and personal care. Assistance may be provided by relatives
(informal care) and also by professional services (formal care), whose utiliza-
tion is increasing. In most countries, public policies foster the utilization of
formal home care by subsidizing its consumption. These programs, however,
only partially cover the cost of professional home care and the disabled elderly
often bear non-negligible out-of-pocket (OOP) costs. In France, the average
monthly OOP payment for home care was estimated to be e300 in 2011 (Fiz-
zala, 2016); over one fifth of the average pension (Solard, 2015).
We address the following question: how sensitive to price are the disabled
elderly when consuming professional home care? Besides concerns regarding
the financial accessibility of long-term care services, OOP payments raise ef-
ficiency issues. As in the health care context, generous home care subsidies
may induce over-consumption and a welfare loss, while insufficient coverage
could have adverse health effects (Stabile et al., 2006; Rapp et al., 2015; Bar-
nay and Juin, 2016) or induce beneficiaries to substitute home care for more
expensive institutional care (Ettner, 1994; Guo et al., 2015). Uncovering the
impact of OOP price on home care consumption is crucial to design an optimal
subsidy policy that would achieve ex ante insurance of uncertain LTC costs
while limiting ex post demand-side moral hazard (Zeckhauser, 1970; Cutler
and Zeckhauser, 2000; Bakx et al., 2015). Our paper brings evidence on this
empirical question by estimating the price elasticity of the demand for non-
medical home care services of the disabled elderly, at the intensive margin.
We focus on the French home care scheme targeted to the disabled el-
derly, the APA (Allocation personnalise´e d’autonomie) policy, which counted
738,000 community-dwelling beneficiaries in 2014 and amounted to a spend-
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ing of 3.1 billion euros in 2013 (0.15% of GDP).1 Administrative records of
the scheme provide detailed information on home care consumption and OOP
payments of APA beneficiaries but they are available only at the local level.
We use an original dataset made of the individual records we collected for
the beneficiaries of a given Departmental Council (Conseil de´partemental).
We exploit inter-individual variations in provider prices to identify consumer
price elasticity. Price endogeneity may arise if APA beneficiaries non-randomly
choose their home care provider. To address this issue, we exploit the unequal
spatial coverage by providers in the department. We fit a censored regression
model to deal with observational issues and control for disposable income and
other individual characteristics likely to affect the consumption of home care.
Our results indicate a negative price elasticity, with point estimates ranging
from−0.5 to−0.1. According to our favoured estimation, an increase of 10% of
the hourly OOP price would reduce total hours consumed by 4% on average,
or 70 minutes per month for a beneficiary consuming the median monthly
volume of 18 hours. Although confidence intervals are relatively large, we
statistically reject a price elasticity of both 0 and −1 in most specifications.
Our paper provides one of the very first estimates of the price elasticity of
the demand for home care services of the disabled elderly. Despite the growing
concern about the financing of long-term care, the impact of OOP payments
on the consumption of home care has been little investigated in the economic
literature. A few papers tested for the effect of benefiting from subsidies on
the utilization of paid home care (Coughlin et al., 1992; Ettner, 1994; Pezzin
et al., 1996; Stabile et al., 2006; Rapp et al., 2011; Fontaine, 2012); because
of data limitations, they were not able to quantify the price sensitivity. To
our knowledge, the only existing studies addressing this gap in the literature
exploit French data. Using national survey data, Hege (2016) makes assump-
tions on unobserved OOP prices and estimates a price elasticity of −0.16.
Bourreau-Dubois et al. (2014) use APA records from a department to observe
exact home care prices, as we do, and estimate an elasticity of −0.55. We use
a different, original dataset and propose an instrumental variable strategy to
deal with potential price endogeneity.
Our results entail important policy implications, as home care subsidy
schemes are expanding with population ageing. Home care consumption is
found to be price sensitive, meaning that home care support programs have
efficiency implications. Moreover, since consumption of home care reacts less
1Drees (2013, 2014). The APA program also has a component for the elderly living in nursing homes.
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than proportionately to a price change, home care subsidies should be regarded
as a tool to achieve redistribution from taxpayers to the disabled elderly and
reduce OOP spending on long-term care.
2 INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND DE-
MAND FOR HOME CARE
2.1 The APA program
The French APA program aims at fostering the utilization of professional
care services by the elderly requiring assistance in the activities of daily living
(household chores, meal preparation or personal hygiene). The APA policy is
established at the national level and implemented at the departmental level.2
To be eligible, an individual must be at least 60 years-old and recognized as
disabled. This second condition requires a specific assessment from a team
managed by the Departmental Council, called the evaluation team, made of
medical professionals (nurses, doctors) and/or social workers. The evaluation
team visits each APA applicant to evaluate her needs of assistance using a
national standardized scale. The applicant is thus assigned a disability group
(Groupe Iso-Ressources, or GIR). Individuals found to be moderately (GIR-4)
to extremely disabled (GIR-1) are eligible for APA, while the least severely
disabled (GIR-5 or -6) are not.
The evaluation team then establishes a “personalized care plan”. This
document lists the activities for which the individual needs assistance and
sets the number of hours necessary to their realization. It gives the maximum
number of hours eligible for APA subsidies of each beneficiary, called the care
plan volume.3 Up to the care plan volume, the OOP price of each hour of
care is lowered by the APA subsidy. The beneficiary is free to consume hours
beyond the care plan volume but there are no more subsidies.
2.2 Computation rules of APA subsidies
For subsidized hours, the APA beneficiary is charged an hourly OOP price
that depends on both the provider price and a co-payment rate, increasing
2Metropolitan France is divided into 95 departments.
3The monetary valuation of the care plan volume must not exceed a legal ceiling, which depends on
the disability level. At the end of 2014, the ceiling was e1,313 (resp. e563) per month for GIR-1 (resp.
GIR-4). Appendix D provides more elements on the set up of the care plan volume.
3
Pay less, consume more? Roquebert and Tenand
with disposable income. For low-income individuals (below e739 per month
at the end of 2014) the co-payment rate is zero, while it reaches 90% for the
richest beneficiaries (monthly income above e2,945). In between the two, the
co-payment rate is an increasing linear function of disposable income.4
If the provider chosen by the beneficiary is authorized, then the hourly
OOP price is given by applying the co-payment rate to the regulated price
charged by the provider.5 For “non–authorized” providers,6 the co-payment
rate is applied to a lump–sum price to get the OOP price. This distinction has
important implications for what can be known of beneficiaries’ OOP payments,
since Departmental Councils usually keep track only of the prices of authorized
providers.
2.3 Modeling demand for home care with APA
We write the Marshallian demand for professional home care assuming a
heterogeneity-only model (Moffitt, 1986):
h∗i = g(CPi, Iˆi;Xi) + νi (1)
where h∗i is the number of hours of home care consumed by individual i
and g(.) denotes the demand function. Care consumption depends on the
consumer (or OOP) price for one hour of home care, CPi, on the total dispos-
able income available for consumption Iˆi, and on individual socio-demographic
characteristics, Xi. νi is an individual preference shifter.
With APA, up to the care plan volume denoted h¯i, the hours consumed
are subsidized. The consumer price is CPi = c(Ii)pi, where pi is the provider
price for individual i and the co-payment rate ci is a function of individual i’s
monetary disposable income: ci = c(Ii), with c(.) a linear function.
Beyond the care plan volume h¯i, the consumer price equals the full provider
price as there is no APA subsidy any more. The budget constraint is:{
Ii = cipih
∗
i + Yi if h
∗
i ≤ h¯i
Ii = cipih¯i + pi(h
∗
i − h¯i) + Yi ⇐⇒ Ii + (1− ci)pih¯i = pih∗i + Yi if h∗i > h¯i
4The schedule of APA co-payments was substantially reformed in 2016. We describe the pre-reform
schedule.
549 metropolitan Departmental Councils out of the 73 that answered a national survey conducted
in 2012 applied this computation rule (LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012; Bourreau-Dubois et al., 2015).
Authorized providers are generally priced by the Departmental Councils.
6It can be either a non-authorized structure (service agre´e´ non-autorise´) or an over-the-counter worker
(gre´-a`-gre´ or mandataire). See Appendix E for more details on the French home care sector.
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where Y denotes the composite good, with price set to 1. The APA program
creates a kink in the budget constraint of the beneficiary (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Budget constraint for home care under APA program
h*
Y
I
p
+ (1− c)h¯ I
cp
I
h¯
I + (1− c)ph¯
Slope : −p
Slope : −cp
As shown by the previous system, when deciding upon an increase in home
care consumption beyond h¯i, the individual should take into account not only
her monetary disposable income Ii but also the subsidies received on the first
h¯i hours of care she has consumed. Denoting I˜i = Ii+(1−ci)pih¯i the “virtual”
income of individual i (Moffitt, 1986, 1990), we rewrite the demand function
specified in Equation (1) as follows:
h∗i = g(cipi, Ii;Xi) + νi if h
∗
i < h¯i
g(pi, I˜i;Xi) + νi ≤ h¯i ≤ g(cipi, Ii;Xi) + νi if h∗i = h¯i
h∗i = g(pi, I˜i;Xi) + νi if h
∗
i > h¯i
The objective of the paper is to obtain an empirical estimate of the following
quantity, which is the point price elasticity:
dg(CP, Iˆ;X)
dCP
CP
g(CP, Iˆ;X)
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3 DATA
3.1 Administrative data from a Departmental Council
In France, there is no national survey or administrative data set that pro-
vides precise information on both the OOP payments and the formal home
care use of the disabled elderly. We collected data from one Departmental
Council that uses the most frequent APA subsidy computation rule. We se-
lected a department with demographic characteristics close to the national
averages, although its population has higher than average incomes (Appendix
A.1).
Data were collected for every month in 2012–2014. Since within year varia-
tion in provider prices is negligible, we only use data for the month of October,7
when home care consumption is less likely to be affected by temporary shocks
(like holidays and visits from children).
3.2 Sample selection
To ensure clean identification, we focus on APA beneficiaries served by an
authorized home care provider for which the provider price is observed: we
exclude 23% of beneficiaries of the initial sample as they receive care from
other providers. We also exclude beneficiaries with missing information on
subsidized consumption around the month of interest, so as to limit the risk
that unobserved shocks (temporary absences or hospitalizations) could bias
the estimates.
In addition, we exclude beneficiaries whose co-payment rate is zero: their
OOP price on subsidized hours is zero. We also exclude beneficiaries whose co-
payment is equal to 90%: the relationship between their disposable income and
their co-payment rate is not linear and this makes identification more complex.
We end up with 8,190 individuals, or about 2,700 per year, representing 51%
of the initial sample.8
7Averaging consumption and OOP prices on an annual basis would hamper identification by blurring
the true empirical relationship between price and consumption.
8Appendix A.2 provides more details.
6
Pay less, consume more? Roquebert and Tenand
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Columns [3] and [4] of Table I describe our estimation sample for October
2014.9 The typical individual is a woman, in her mid-80s and living alone.
Six APA beneficiaries out of ten do not consume their full care plan volume;
price sensitivity is one possible candidate to explain part of this high figure.
Columns [1] and [2] present the same statistics for two larger populations
we selected our final sample from (all APA beneficiaries / all beneficiaries with
an authorized provider). The last two columns indicate whether our sample
and the larger samples differ in statistical terms. Differences are significant in
terms of income and disability level, translating into differences in co-payment
rate and care plan volume and value.10
4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
4.1 A censored measure of home care consumption
APA files register the individual number of home care hours that are
charged by the provider to the Departmental Council or, equivalently, the
subsidized hours of home care. However, we do not observe the total volume
of home care consumed by each APA beneficiary. For the beneficiaries whose
recorded consumption equals their care plan volume (40% of our sample), our
measure of home care consumption is then right-censored.11
Denote hi the number of home care hours billed to the Departmental Coun-
cil for beneficiary i. We observe:{
hi = g(cipi, Ii;Xi) + νi if g(cipi, Ii;Xi) + νi < h¯i
hi = h¯i if g(cipi, Ii;Xi) + νi ≥ h¯i
(2)
Hence, the parameters of the demand function g(.) can only be identified
from information relating to the first segment of the budget constraint. For
individuals with the maximum number of billed hours h¯i, the only information
9We present the data of October 2014 to draw a better picture of the population of interest. Appendix
?? replicates these statistics for the pooled sample.
10Implications for the external validity of the analysis will be discussed in Section 5.
11No public source, at either the departmental or the national level, provides information on home
care consumption beyond the care plan volume. However, data collected on a large provider operating
in a French department show that 17% of its customers receiving APA consume strictly more than their
care plan volume, with a median “over-consumption” of 1.5 hour per month (Fontaine and Gramain,
forthcoming).
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Table I: Descriptive statistics for estimation sample and all program beneficiaries (October
2014)
All benefi-
ciaries
Beneficiaries
with an
authorized
provider
Estimation sample Differences
between
samples
Mean Mean Mean Std-dev. P–value
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [1]− [3] [2]− [3]
Care plan volume [a] n.a. 21.9 20.5 10.7 n.c. 0.00
Care plan monetary value [b] n.a. e471.7 e455.5 e238.3 n.c. 0.00
Hours effectively subsidized [c] n.a. n.a. 17.7 10.9 n.c. n.c.
Amount of effective subsidies [d] n.a. n.a. e300.8 e201.4 n.c. n.c.
[c] inferior to [a] n.a. n.a. 59.8% - n.c. n.c.
Ratio [c]/[a] n.c. n.c. 85.0% 20.7 pp. n.c. n.c.
Ratio [d]/[b] n.c. n.c. 65.1% 22.2 pp. n.c. n.c.
Individualized income e1,324.5 e1,264.6 e1,315.8 e422.5 0.00 0.00
co-payment rate 24.4% 22.3% 23.7% 17.3pp. 0.01 0.00
Authorized provider price n.a. e22.2 e22.2 e1.3 n.c. 0.04
Hourly OOP price n.a. e4.9 e5.2 e3.8 n.c. 0.00
Total OOP payments n.a. e84.5 e91.3 e98.6 n.c. 0.00
on subsidized hours
Age n.a. 84.1 84.2 7.4 n.c. 0.29
Women 76.7% 73.8% 74.0% - 0.03 0.76
Disability level 1 (most severe) 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% -
0.00 0.00
Disability level 2 14.5% 13.8% 12.5% -
Disability level 3 21.2% 21.0% 19.6% -
Disability level 4 (least severe) 62.8% 63.9% 66.7% -
100% 100% 100%
Living with a spouse 32.1% 31.0% 33.8% -
0.00 0.00Living alone 66.6% 67.5% 65.6% -
Spouse in institution 1.3% 1.6% 0.6% -
100% 100% 100%
Number of individuals 5,486 4,199 2,862 - -
Number of households n.a. n.a. 2,785 - -
Samples: [1]: sample of all at–home APA beneficiaries of the department; [2]: sample of beneficiaries
who receive care, but not necessarily exclusively, from an authorized provider; [3] and [4]: estimation
sample.
Notes: “pp.” stands for percentage points, “n.a.” for “not available”, “n.c.” for “not computable”
(available information is insufficient). Information on care plan volume, effective consumption and
provider price is not available when the beneficiary receives care from a non-authorized provider. Care
plan volume and effective home care consumption are expressed in hours per month; income, subsidies
and total OOP payments are expressed in euros per month. Data from October 2014.
Tests: The last two columns present the p-values from the tests of difference between the estimation
sample and non-selected beneficiaries. The test performed is a Student (resp. Pearson χ2) test if variable
is binary or continuous (resp. categorical). The tests compare the mean or distribution in the estimation
sample with the reference sample ([1] or [2]) excluding the estimation sample.
we can use is that their demand is at least as high as this number.12
12Appendix C provides more details.
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4.2 Econometric specification
Since the distribution of (observed) home care consumption is slightly
skewed, we assume a log-linear specification of g(.), as follows:
ln(h∗it) = β0 + β1.ln(cit.p
j
it) + β2.ln(Iit) +X
′
it.θ + λt + it (3)
where pjit denotes the price charged by provider j chosen by individual i
in year t13 and λt are year fixed effects. Both price and income are included
in log so that β1 represents the consumer price elasticity and β2 captures the
income elasticity of the demand for home care services. As c(.) is fully linear
in income in the sample,14 Equation 3 can be rewritten as:
ln(h∗it) = γ0 + β1.ln(p
j
it) + (β1 + β2).ln(Iit) +X
′
it.θ + λt + it (4)
Equation (4) makes it clear that the income variations identify the em-
pirical income effect within the APA framework. With APA, any marginal
increase in the disposable income has two effects. First, it increases home care
consumption, provided home care is a normal good (standard income effect).
Then, it induces the reassessment of the co-payment rate, which may further
affect home care consumption through an increased OOP price (price effect).
As System (2) corresponds to the typical observational scheme underly-
ing censored regression model, β1 and β2 can be estimated by Maximum
Likelihood after making a parametric assumption on  (Tobit model).15 Our
favoured specification though, is a more flexible version of Equation (4). In
Equation (9), we take as dependent variable the log-share of the care plan
volume consumed by the individual, h∗it/h¯it (call it “relative consumption”)
and include the care plan volume h¯it as a control. Equation (4) is nested in
Equation (9) and β˜1 can still be interpreted as a price elasticity.
16
ln(h∗it/h¯it) = γ˜0+ β˜1.ln(p
j
it)+(β˜1+ β˜2).ln(Iit)+ β˜3.ln(h¯it)+X
′
it.θ˜+ λ˜t+ ˜it (5)
This specification comes with several advantages. First, it includes h¯it as a
control, which might be a proxy of the unobserved determinants of consump-
13All beneficiaries with the same provider are charged the same provider price, before APA co-payment
rate applies.
14The relationship between cit and Iit depends on the year the co-payment rate was set. We control
for this source of inter- and intra-individual variation in our estimations. Appendix B.1 provides more
details.
15Appendix C derives the Maximum Likelihood function.
16Appendix B.1 provides more details.
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tion.17 Technically, relative home care consumption has a better-behaved dis-
tribution than absolute consumption, making parametric estimates more likely
to be consistent.18 Its censoring point is unique (equal to 0), which eases the
implementation of the estimation.
Our baseline estimates are obtained fitting a population-average19 censored
regression estimation of Equation (9) assuming that:
˜ | p, I, h¯, X, λ˜ ∼ N (0, σ˜2). (6)
4.3 Identification using cross-sectional variations in prices
As suggested by Equations (4) and (9), the consumer price elasticity of
demand is identified by the cross-sectional variation in provider prices. In
the department, there are 28 authorized providers. Each provider price is
reassessed every year. In the panel, provider prices range from e19.35 to
e23.50, with an average of e21.8 and a standard-deviation of e1.3. As yearly
variation in prices was small between 2012 and 2014, most of the price variation
is cross-sectional.20
To get unbiased estimates, the provider price charged to individual i must
be uncorrelated with the unobserved factors affecting her home care consump-
tion, i. Supply-demand simultaneity may violate this condition (Zhen et al.,
2014), but it should be negligible in our context. Indeed, although each
provider is priced by the Departmental Council on the basis of its average
production cost of two years earlier, the pricing process largely depends on
administrative and political considerations (Gramain and Xing, 2012).
The risk of omitted variable biases is more difficult to dismiss. Beneficiaries
may non-randomly select their provider (price) on the basis of some unobserv-
able individual characteristics such as quality expectations, unobserved health
condition or informal care provision (Billaud et al., 2012). Some sources of
price variations can be documented and are unlikely to be correlated with
unobserved determinants of home care consumption (Appendix F), but it is
insufficient to rule out any price endogeneity induced by non-random provider
17The care plan volume is supposedly based only on the specific activity restrictions of the beneficiary;
but qualitative studies have shown that the evaluation team is likely to take into account additional
characteristics of the individual, such as the informal care she receives (Billaud et al., 2012).
18See Figures B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B.2.
19We use the unbalanced sample: selecting individuals staying in the APA programme for three years
would raise additional selection issues.
20On average, provider prices increased by 1.9% between October 2012 and 2013 and by 1.3% between
2013 and 2014.
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choice. To address this potential bias, we exploit the unequal spatial coverage
by authorized providers in the department.
4.4 An instrumental variable strategy
We propose to instrument the provider price by the number of municipali-
ties in which the provider serves APA beneficiaries and estimate an IV-Tobit.
To be valid, our instrument must first correlate with the price, conditional on
the control variables. Second, it must be uncorrelated with the unobserved
determinants of professional home care consumption.
From a practical standpoint, serving more municipalities translates into
higher transportation and coordination costs for a provider. Exploiting the
service files of a large French home care provider, an ongoing study suggests
that the monetary costs associated to the travels of caregivers could represent
from 4 to 20% of the price charged by a provider. This share is found to vary
with the organization of caregivers’ rounds. For authorized providers, such
costs are partially incorporated in the price set by the Departmental Council
(Gramain and Xing, 2012). Several public and research reports on the French
home care sector have insisted on the heterogeneity in transportation costs
borne by providers and the differences in prices it induces (Aube-Martin et al.,
2010; Vanlerenberghe and Watrin, 2014; Branchu et al., 2015; Garabige et al.,
2015).
In our data, as is evidenced by Figure G.4, the price charged by a given
provider and the number of municipalities in which it operates are positively
correlated. The IV-Tobit first stage (Table II) shows that a one standard-
deviation increase in the number of municipalities served by the provider is
associated with a 4.9% increase in its price. The F-statistic associated with
this estimate exceeds 143 - a figure far higher than the conventional threshold
used to assess the risk that the instrument is weak (Staiger and Stock, 1997).
A potential threat to the exclusion restriction is that the instrument may
correlate with individual consumption through another channel than the price
charged by the provider. In particular, it would be the case if the number
of hours provided by a service systematically increases its provision costs due
to decreasing returns to scale. Apart from transportation and coordination
costs though, the care provision process may be assumed to exhibit roughly
constant returns to scale, as most of the provision costs is made of caregivers’
wages. The strong association between the price charged by a provider and
its geographical area of operation is thus unlikely to be driven by the volume
11
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of care it delivers.
Figure 2: Correlation between provider price and number of municipalities served by the
provider
Notes: The number of municipalities served by each provider is constructed
using information on all APA beneficiaries receiving home care from an au-
thorized provider in October 2012, 2013 and 2014 (and not just the benefi-
ciaries retained in the estimation sample). The line is fitted using all three
years of observation. To make the graphical representation more readable,
we excluded the largest provider. With 199 municipalities served in October
2014, it charged the highest price over the 3 years of observation (e23.5 in
2014). The positive correlation displayed by the graph is preserved when we
include the largest provider.
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1 Main results
Table II presents our main results, obtained on the panel data.21 Col-
umn (1) presents Tobit estimates of Equation (9). Column (2) presents the
estimates we obtain when the price is instrumented by the number of munici-
palities served by the provider.22 We cluster the standard errors at the provider
level since our “treatment” variable, pjit, essentially varies at the provider level
(Moulton, 1990; Cameron and Miller, 2015).
When the provider price is considered as exogenous, the consumer price
elasticity estimate is about −0.45. When using our instrument, the coeffi-
21The coefficients displayed give the predicted impact of a marginal (or 0/1) change in a given explana-
tory variable on the total, uncensored relative home care consumption.
22We use the parametric version of Stata command ivtobit. We thus assume the error terms of the
first-stage and second-stage equations are jointly normally distributed.
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Table II: Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours
———— Tobit———— ——— IV-Tobit ———
(1) (2)
Panel A: Second stage Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h¯ (log)
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.387∗∗
(0.181) (0.192)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008)
Care plan volume (log) 0.040∗ 0.040∗
(0.023) (0.023)
Woman 0.029∗∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.014) (0.014)
Age: 60–69 -0.124∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.047)
Age: 70–79 -0.042∗∗ -0.042∗∗
(0.017) (0.017)
Age: 80-89 Ref. Ref.
Age: 90 or older 0.051∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015)
Disability group: 1 (most severe) 0.154∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.057)
Disability group: 2 0.027 0.027
(0.022) (0.022)
Disability group: 3 Ref. Ref.
Disability group: 4 (least severe) 0.008 0.009
(0.012) (0.012)
Living with no spouse 0.107∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
Spouse receives APA 0.036 0.037
(0.034) (0.034)
Spouse in institution 0.170∗ 0.170∗
(0.095) (0.094)
Living with non–APA spouse Ref. Ref.
Constant 1.225∗∗ 1.032∗
(0.556) (0.592)
Panel B: First stage Dependent variable: provider price p (log)
Number of municipalities (std.) 0.049∗∗∗
(0.004)
F statistic 143.98
Observations 8190 8190
Censored observations 39.6% 39.6%
Number of clusters 28 28
AIC 11454 -22049
BIC 11644 -21860
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level; ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Pooled data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014. Estima-
tion of a Tobit or IV–Tobit model by Maximum Likelihood. In the first stage (Panel B),
the log–provider price is regressed on the standardized number of municipalities served by
the provider. All specifications include year fixed effects, dummies for the year in which the
co–payment rate was computed as well as dummies for the year the latest plan was decided
upon (in the first and second stages for the IV–Tobit estimation).
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cient is slightly lower in absolute value. The difference between the two is not
statistically significant, suggesting that the potential bias due to non-random
provider selection may be limited.23 Overall, price elasticity estimates are neg-
ative, statistically significant, confirming that the disabled elderly are sensitive
to the price of professional home care. Our favoured estimation (Column (2)),
which instruments the price, gives a point estimate of −0.387, or about −0.4.
The income effect in the APA framework appears negative, but negligible
and statistically not different from zero. Richer APA beneficiaries do not tend
to consume more formal care, all other things being equal. With ˆ˜β1 +
ˆ˜β2 close
to zero, our estimations suggest that the increase in the co-payment rate,
induced by an increase in income, compensates for the standard income effect.
We also derive an estimate of the standard income elasticity β˜2. Both the
Tobit and the IV-Tobit give a value of about 0.4, statistically different from
zero. Although this income effect is imprecisely estimated,24 we are able to
conclude that home care is a necessity good for the disabled elderly.
Individuals with a higher care plan volume tend to consume a larger share
of their care plan. For a given disability level, a higher care plan volume could
be explained by a lower provision of informal care. Alternatively, a higher care
plan may also have a stronger prescriptive effect.
As expected, the highly-disabled individuals consume relatively more than
the beneficiaries with mild to moderate disability, all other factors being equal.
Even when controlling for the disability level, age retains a significant effect
on the consumption on home care services. Being a woman increases the con-
sumption of professional home care relative to the care plan volume, by a
small but statistically significant amount. Living alone (spouse in institution
or no spouse) increases the amount of professional assistance received, consis-
tently with previous works showing the importance of the co-residing spouse
in providing informal care substituting partly for formal home care services.
5.2 Further results and robustness checks
We replicate the estimations on each year separately (Appendix G.1); price
elasticity estimates are found to range from −0.54 to −0.13. Precision is low
23We implement a cluster Bootstrap Hausman test. We cannot reject that the provider price is exoge-
nous (p = 0.88).
24 ˆ˜β2 corresponds to the difference between the empirical income elasticity with APA and the price
elasticity estimates; the associated standard error is high (around 0.19), due to the relatively large
standard error of the price elasticity estimate.
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but we can reject that the price elasticity is zero (except for 2014) or unity.25
We check our results are robust to the fact that inference relies on a small
number of clusters by implementing a cluster percentile-t bootstrap (Appendix
G.2). Statistical significance of the price elasticity is preserved at the 5% level
on the pooled sample.
To investigate the potential heterogeneity in price sensitivity, we estimate
the model interacting the price with the disability level or the income level
(Table III).
Table III: Price elasticity of home care by severity of disability and income
Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.323 -0.446∗∗
(0.181) (0.236) (0.178)
Price (log) × disability group 4 (least severe) -0.190
(0.270)
Price (log) × income above median -0.019∗∗∗
(0.006)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.010 0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Observations 8190 8190 8190
Censored observations 39.6% 39.6% 39.6%
Number of clusters 28 28 28
AIC 11454 11453 11439
BIC 11643 11642 11629
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level; ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Pooled data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014. Estima-
tion of Tobit model by Maximum Likelihood. All specifications include as controls
the care plan volume, socio-demographic characteristics, year fixed effects, dummies
for the year in which the co-payment rate was computed as well as dummies for the
year the latest plan was decided upon.
A credible IV strategy would require to find an additional instrument for
each interaction term. As Table II suggests that the bias due to potential
price endogeneity is limited, we fit a simple Tobit model when adding the
interaction terms. We expected more severely disabled individuals to be less
price sensitive, but we are not able to detect such an effect. Price sensitivity is
higher for individuals whose income is above the sample median income. This
result echoes Duarte (2012), who finds that higher income individuals are
more price elastic in their medical care consumption. Richer individuals may
25Precision in 2014 is lower, as a provider closed down.
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be more able to understand the health care system and cost-sharing schedules
due to a higher financial literacy.
As a robustness check, we implement an alternative identification strategy
(Appendix G.3). We estimate our equation of interest (without instrumenting
the price) on the sub-sample of APA beneficiaries who live in a municipality
where a single authorized provider is found to operate. In a context in which
price selection is arguably limited, we find a price elasticity estimate around
-0.5- not statistically different from our main result.
5.3 Discussion
Our results confirm that the consumption of home care of the disabled
elderly is sensitive to the price they pay. Decisions relating to formal home care
consumption are influenced by a trade-off between the OOP price of an extra
hour and its marginal value. Such a pecuniary trade-off has been documented
at the extensive margin, as the take-up of APA benefits is affected by the
average subsidy rate in the department (Arrighi et al., 2015). Innovatively, we
find evidence that the price elasticity of the demand for home care is seemingly
lower than unity at the intensive margin: the adjustment of consumption is
proportionally lower than a given change in price. This implies a positive price
elasticity of OOP expenditures: a decrease in the OOP price should lead to a
decrease in total OOP payments.
The price sensitivity we obtain is of an order of magnitude similar to the
estimates found for health care demand. Although the magnitude of the −0.2
estimate derived from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (Manning et al.,
1987; Keeler and Rolph, 1988) is subject to discussion (Aron-Dine et al., 2013),
a large literature has confirmed that medical spending is price-elastic, with
price sensitivity varying with the type of care (Duarte, 2012; Fukushima et al.,
2016). Our paper provides interesting evidence that, at the intensive margin,
home care consumption is closer to acute care than to elective care in terms
of price sensitivity.
Our OOP price measure does not take into account possible tax reductions
on home care services, unobserved in the APA records. Without sufficient
information to simulate them, we implicitly assume APA beneficiaries to be
sensitive to the “spot” price (Geoffard, 2000). We also assume that APA
recipients react in the same way to variations in the co-payment rate and in
the provider price. If salience differs (Chetty et al., 2009), implications for the
design of the co-payment schedule are less straightforward.
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In our administrative data, information on family characteristics is poor.
Receiving more informal care has been found to decrease formal care use,
both at the extensive and intensive margins (Van Houtven and Norton, 2004;
Bonsang, 2009). Omitting informal care provision could bias the estimates of
our entire set of coefficients. This is all the more of a concern as the share
of (self-declared) APA beneficiaries who declare receiving some informal help
is higher in the department than in the rest of France.26 As a robustness
check, we include as a control whether the individual receives formal home
care during the weekend and public holidays (Appendix G.4). We hypothesize
that individuals not receiving professional home care over the weekend are
more likely to receive assistance from their relatives. Receiving formal care
during the weekend is associated with more hours consumed during working
days; reassuringly though, it does not significantly affect the price elasticity
estimate.
Finally, external validity of our results should be qualified. Without data
covering the entire population eligible to APA, the potential bias induced
by the differential take-up of APA subsidies (Chauveaud and Warin, 2005)
cannot be dealt with. Our sample is not nationally representative and we
focus on APA recipients who consume home care from authorized services. As
the department is slightly richer than France as a whole, and price sensitivity
being greater for richer beneficiaries, our estimates may be an upper bound (in
absolute value). Yet the department is reasonably close to “average France” in
terms of other socio-demographic characteristics and most APA beneficiaries
in France receive care from authorized providers (Hege et al., 2014). Finally,
our results are in line with the two available estimates (Bourreau-Dubois et al.,
2014; Hege, 2016), which rely on different estimation strategies and data.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper estimates the consumer price elasticity of the demand for pro-
fessional home care services of the disabled elderly benefiting from the French
APA program. Our results suggest this parameter is about −0.4, with point
estimates statistically different from zero and unity in absolute value.
Our findings pave the way for several policy implications. With income
having no effect in the APA scheme, we can interpret our price elasticity esti-
mate as a sufficient statistics for the substitution effect in home care subsidy
26Over four-fifths in the department, against 75% in metropolitan France (Insee-Drees, 2014).
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schemes. As the disabled elderly are sensitive to the price of care, the co-
payment rates in home care subsidy programs entail allocative and dynamic
efficiency issues. Given the low value of the price elasticity, the generosity of
home care subsidies also has substantial redistributive effects from taxpayers
to the disabled elderly.
While remaining cautious regarding the external validity of the results,
our estimates can be used to discuss the effects of potential reforms of home
care subsidies. The decrease of co-payment rates enacted by the 2016 APA
reform, higher for low-income recipients, should reduce overall OOP expenses
on professional home care of current APA recipients, while having a limited
volume effect.
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A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE
DATA
A.1 Comparison of the department studied with metropoli-
tan France
Table A.I compares the department studied to metropolitan France. We
use either administrative sources ([A]: Insee et al. (2013); [B]: Insee (2014);
[D]: Drees (2013)) or survey data ([C]: Insee-Drees (2014)).
Column [1] gives descriptive statistics on metropolitan France while Col-
umn [2] focuses on the department studied. Column [2] reports intervals
around the true department value to preserve its anonymity. Bounds are
computed so that 20% of the French departments closest to the department
of interest (weighting by the size of the departmental population aged 60 or
more) have a value lying in the interval.27 If the department is located in
the bottom quintile, we report as a lower bound the minimum value observed
across French departments for the variable; similarly, when the department
ranks in the top quintile, the upper bound we report is the maximum value
observed in metropolitan France.
The third column tests the significance of the differences between the first
two columns. For statistics computed using exhaustive administrative sources
([A], [B] and [D]), we test whether the department population can be consid-
ered as a random draw from the French metropolitan population. When using
survey data ([C]), the tests of difference compare the sample of the respondents
of the department with the respondents of the rest of France.
Although differences are quasi-systematic in statistical terms, the selected
department has socio-demographic characteristics close to that of France over-
all. Our selected department is however richer than the rest of France: it has
a higher share of households subject to the income tax and a lower poverty
rate in the 75+ population, although the median taxable income in the de-
partment is only slightly higher than in France. Albeit the prevalence of
functional limitations in the 60+ population is similar in the department and
in the rest of France, the rate of APA beneficiaries is slightly higher in our
department. This possibly reflects local variations in the way the APA policy
27Insee et al. (2013) directly provides the deciles of the taxable income distribution in the metropolitan
French population aged 75 or more. The department is found to be richer than the 40% least wealthy
departments, but poorer than the 40% richest departments. We use the 4th and 6th deciles of the national
distribution to bound the median taxable income observed in the department studied.
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is implemented (Billaud et al., 2012).
Table A.I: Descriptive statistics for department studied and metropolitan France
Metropolitan
France
Department Difference
(p. value)
Source
Variable [1] [2] [1]− [2] -
General population
Households subject to income tax 58.2% [61.9%-75.1%] 0.00 [A]
60+ population/total population 24.4% [23.8%-26.3%] 0.00 [B]
Elderly population (60+)
Average age 71.8 [71.3-71.7] 0.00
[C]
Health status (functional limitations)
0.48
Level 1 (least severe) 64.9% [63.9%-66.2%]
Level 2 21.4% [20.1%-21.0%]
Level 3 7.7% [7.2%-7.8%]
Level 4 (most severe) 6.0% [6.3%-7.0%]
100% 100%
Poverty rate in 75+ population 8.9% [6.9%-7.9%] 0.00
[A]
Median taxable income (75+ households) e19,536 [e17,380-e22,050] n.c.
Rate of APA beneficiaries 7.8% [8.1%-9.1%] 0.00
[D]
At-home recipients/all APA beneficiaries 58.7% [56.1%-60.6%] 0.00
At-home APA beneficiaries
Woman 73.7% [71.7%-72.8%] 0.00
[D]
Age groups
n.c.
Age 60-74 12.7% [11.2%-12.7%]
Age 75-79 13.6% [13.8%-14.6%]
Age 80-84 23.9% [23.5%-24.4%]
Age 85+ 49.7% [49.2%-51.0%]
100% 100%
Living arrangements
0.88 [C]
Living alone 55.3% [54.7%-56.9%]
Living with her spouse 30.4% [27.7%-32.7%]
Living with a relative other than
her spouse
14.3% [9.5%-12.5%]
100% 100%
Disability level
n.c.
[D]
Disability level 1 (most severe) 2.4% [1.7%-2.1%]
Disability level 2 16.8% [14.1%-15.6%]
Disability level 3 22.1% [20.0%-21.7%]
Disability level 4 (least severe) 58.8% [60.5%-64.5%]
100% 100%
Amount of effective subsidies e361.1 [e329.1-e350.5] n.c.
Sources: [A]: Insee et al. (2013); [B]: Insee (2014); [C]: Insee-Drees (2014) - APA benefit is self-declared.
Rate of spousal co-residence may be underestimated; [D]: Drees (2013)- Administrative files on APA
beneficiaries in 2013, all French departments. Decomposition by sex and age (resp. by disability level)
not available in 21 (resp. in 5) departments.
Notes: Column [2] reports intervals around the true department value to preserve its anonymity. Bounds
are computed so that 20% of the French departments closest to the department of interest (weighting by
the size of the departmental population aged 60 or more) have a value lying in the interval.
Tests: n.c. stands for “not computable”. Test performed is a Student (resp. a Pearson χ2) test for
binary (resp. categorical) variables.
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A.2 Sample selection
This Appendix aims at documenting the selection steps the data from
October 2014 have gone through. We follow the same steps to construct the
samples of October 2012 and 2013. The percentages of individuals selected at
each step are very similar to what is found for 2014 and are available upon
request.
The initial number of beneficiaries is considered to be 5,486.28 Table A.II
sums up the selection steps.
Table A.II: Sample selection steps
Recipients with an authorized provider at least
All Recipients effectively consuming care in the month
All “Stable” recipients
All Recipients consuming only from
All one authorized provider
All Recipients with
0 < ci < 90%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number 5,486 4,475 4,199 3,527 3,327 2,862
% of previous step - 81.6% 93.8% 84.0% 94.3% 86.1 %
% of initial sample 100% 81.6% 76.5% 64.3% 60.6% 52.2%
Notes: “Stable” APA recipients in October 2014 are defined as those for which information is available
also for the months of September and November 2014. For additional 63 individuals (not in the numbers
here above), the administrative files contain no information on the co-payment rate or or the consumption
of home care hours, or are inconsistent with national APA legislation.
To observe precisely both the out-of-pocket price and the number of hours
that are effectively consumed and subsidized, we retain the beneficiaries re-
ceiving care from an authorized provider. They represent the majority of APA
recipients in the department (more than 4/5).
Among them, about 6% have no actual consumption of home care recorded
in the files. This might be explained by temporary absences (like hospital-
izations) or disruptions (e.g. visits from relatives, who replace temporarily
professional home care services by providing informal care). As the outcome
of interest is missing, we drop these observations. Another 15% of APA recip-
28For October 2014, administrative records indicate that 5,549 beneficiaries were receiving APA; but
for 61 individuals, essential information on subsidized hours, co-payment rate or on matrimonial status
was missing or inconsistent. These individuals are presumably former APA recipients not yet erased from
the files. For 2 additional individuals, the monetary value of the care plan was beyond the national legal
ceiling, signaling a probable error in the records. We dropped these 63 observations from our sample.
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ients with an authorized provider have missing information on subsidized care
consumption for the preceding or the following month. We choose to drop
them to avoid potential unobservable shocks likely to bias our estimations.
The remaining individuals can be regarded as “stable”.
Among beneficiaries actually receiving care from an authorized provider at
least, less than 6% receive care from a secondary provider.29 As we generally
do not observe care consumption from the secondary provider nor its price,30
we drop multiple-provider individuals.
Beneficiaries with income below a certain threshold have a 0% co-payment
rate: their OOP price is zero. Our log-log specification cannot be estimated
on these observations. In addition, so as to make the relationship between
the consumer price and the provider price fully linear in disposable income
(see Appendix B.1), we retain only those individuals with a co-payment rate
strictly below 90%. These two income groups represent respectively 12.7%
and 1.3% of the remaining 3,327 beneficiaries.
We end up with a sample that represents 52% of total at-home APA recip-
ients of the department.
A Heckman-type model would allow to take into account the selection of
our sample on both observable and unobservable factors affecting the demand
for home care. But we do not have any good instrument at hand to construct
an estimator that would not entirely rely on a parametric assumption. We
choose to estimate our parameters of interest directly on the selected sample.
Such a choice imposes to remain cautious about the external validity of our
estimates, as discussed in Section 5.3 of the paper.
29The majority of these beneficiaries receive additional care from an over-the-counter worker (see Sec-
tion E for more details on the different types of home care providers). Over-the-counter workers are
generally cheaper and more flexible than home care structures. 7 individuals receive home care from a
second authorized provider. Theoretically, there might be a third case: beneficiaries could also comple-
ment the care provided by an authorized structure with care provided by a non-authorized structure.
Our files do not allow us to identify such cases; we believe they are marginal, as care provision by non-
authorized structures is rare (only 6% of beneficiaries with no authorized provider receive home care from
a non-authorized structure).
30Even if we had all necessary information, dealing with the simultaneity of consumption decisions
would have made our empirical strategy considerably more complex.
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A.3 Imputation of couples of APA beneficiaries
The data we collected indicate when a beneficiary lives with a partner, but
we do not directly know whether the partner also receives APA. Having an
APA-recipient spouse may correlate with one’s own home care consumption;
failing to control for such a characteristic may bias our estimates.
To identify potential couples in our sample, we checked whether each indi-
vidual could be matched with another recipient of the opposite sex, recorded
as living with a spouse, with exactly the same income31 and residing in the
same municipality. If two individuals match, we assume they belong to the
same household: our estimations will control for the fact of having a spouse
receiving APA.
The matching procedure may fail for individuals whose co-payment rate
is 0%. The reported disposable income is the same for all such individuals,
be they actual spouses or not. The same pitfall applies for individuals whose
co-payment rate is 90%. In these cases, the Departmental Council simply
records the lower or upper income threshold of the APA co-payment schedule.
In October 2014, only 16 individuals were not matched for this reason. But
all our estimations rely on the sample of individuals with a co-payment rate
strictly between 0 and 90%, for who the matching procedure is systematically
successful.
A.4 Descriptive statistics on the pooled sample
Table A.III replicates Columns (3) and (4) of Table I of the paper, by
presenting the descriptive statistics on the pooled sample (and not on the
2014 sample only).
The pooled sample we derive our baseline estimates from is an unbalanced
panel. In this sample, 26% of beneficiaries are present all three waves; another
26% are present only in two waves; finally, 48% are only present in one wave.32
Focusing on the sample of beneficiaries in October 2014, we see that the longer
the individual has been receiving APA, the older she is; this translates into a
higher proportion of women, who have a longer life-expectancy, and a lower
proportion of beneficiaries with a spouse alive among the beneficiaries present
31The APA co-payment schedule takes into account the household income. See Appendix B.1.
32This does not mean that the typical APA recipient benefits from the scheme less than one year. For
individuals observed only in 2012, for example, we do not know whether they were receiving APA one
year or two years before. Average duration of APA benefits is estimated to be around 4 years (Debout,
2010).
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Table A.III: Descriptive statistics on the pooled sample (2012-2014)
Mean Std-dev.
Variable [1] [2]
Care plan volume [a] 20.9 10.7
Care plan monetary value [b] e456.1 e235.8
Hours effectively subsidized [c] 18.1 10.8
Amount of effective subsidies [d] e303.1 e199.2
[c] inferior to [a] 60.4% -
Ratio [c]/[a] 85.6% 19.8pp.
Ratio [d]/[b] 65.5% 21.7pp.
Individualized income e1,301.5 e415.6
co-payment rate 23.8% 17.2pp.
Provider price e21.8 e1.3
OOP price e5.2 e3.8
Total OOP payments e91.6 e95.2
on subsidized hours
Age 84.0 7.3
Woman 73.2% -
Disability level 1 1.2% -
Disability level 2 12.8% -
Disability level 3 20.2% -
Disability level 4 65.8% -
100%
Lives with a spouse 33.8% -
Lives alone 65.6% -
Spouse in institution 0.6% -
100%
Number of individuals 8,190 -
Notes: “pp.” stands for percentage points. Care plan volume and effective
home care consumption are expressed in hours per month; income, subsidies
and total OOP payments are expressed in euros per month. Sample from
October 2012, 2013 and 2014.
in two or three waves. Those beneficiaries tend to be more disabled; they
have, on average, a higher care plan volume and a higher number of hours
subsidized by the APA scheme (consumption relative to the care plan volume
being also higher). On the contrary, we do not see any difference in average
provider and OOP prices, nor in income.
When using the unbalanced sample, we do not select a specific popula-
tion - the new entrants into the APA scheme -; the shortcoming of such
a choice, however, is that the individuals who have been present in several
waves weigh more in the estimation than single-observation individuals. The
cross-sectional estimates presented in Appendix G.1 show that the magnitude
of the price elasticity estimate does not change substantially when replicating
our estimations using the sample of beneficiaries present in October of either
2012, 2013 or 2014.
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B SPECIFICATIONS
B.1 Addressing income and co-payment rate issues in
the empirical specifications
In Section 4.2 of the paper, when taking the absolute consumption as the
dependent variable, our econometric specification is stated as follows:
ln(h∗it) = γ0 + β1.ln(p
j
it) + (β1 + β2).ln(Iit) +X
′
it.θ + λt + it (7)
To ensure a clean identification of the parameters, two features of the
data must be taken into account. First, the disposable income recorded in
the data at time t is not the current value of income but the income when
the co-payment rate was computed or last revised, denoted Iobsit . We express
disposable income at time t as: Iit = ρitI
obs
it , with ρit the rate of increase of
individual disposable income between time t and the year i’s last co-payment
rate was computed. As the rate of increase in disposable income ρit is not
directly observable, we include a dummy 1dit equal to one when i’s co-payment
rate (observed in t) was last revised in year d. Dummy coefficients should
capture the rate of increase in income between years d and t.33 In our data,
most co-payment rates were last computed between 2010 and 2014; for a few
observations though, the latest computation of the co-payment rate is older
(d = 2002, ..., 2014).
Second, the co-payment rate is set to be strictly proportional to the dis-
posable income at the time the latest personalized care plan was defined, Iobsit ,
according to the following function:
cit =
0.9
2MTPDit
Iobsit
where MTPDit is the value of a particular disability allowance (Majoration
pour Tierce-Personne) the year the co-payment rate was last computed for
individual i observed at time t. For a given observed income, the co-payment
might differ according to the year d when the co-payment rate was last com-
puted. Year dummies 1dit, d = 2002, ..., 2014 thus additionally control for
33We implicitly assume the rate of increase in disposable income to be identical for two individuals
observed a given year, whose personalized plans were decided upon the same year d. Retirees’ income is
mostly made of pension benefits (Deloffre, 2009), which are reevaluated every year following the inflation
rate. It remains a strong assumption given the heterogeneity in income composition across the income
distribution.
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inter-individual and intra-individual variation in this parameter.
For 2% of our sample, the relationship between the income and the co-
payment rate does not respect the legal formula used to compute the co-
payment rate. After a careful examination of the data, we hypothesize that
most of these errors occurred when the co-payment rate was computed; con-
versely, we assume the values of income and co-payment rate are well recorded.
We add a dummy variable 1eit signaling whether the observation is affected by
such a calculation error. The full equation to be estimated is then:
ln(h∗it) = γ0+β1.ln(p
j
it)+(β1+β2).ln(I
obs
it )+
2014∑
d=2002
ξd.1dit+ζ.1
e
it+X
′
it.θ+it (8)
Finally, note that our econometric specification includes disposable income
and not income per se. In the APA scheme, disposable income is defined as
the individualized income34 minus an amount equal to 0.67 ×MTPDit (e739
per month for an individual whose income and co-payment rate was last re-
assessed in 2014). It roughly equals the old-age minimum income allowance.
This amount may be regarded as the minimum income that will ensure the
individual can satisfy her basic consumption needs: the individual trades off
home care consumption for other consumption goods only when deciding upon
the allocation of the part of her income in excess of the minimum income al-
lowance.
B.2 Specification with relative consumption
When using the specification with relative consumption, we consider as the
dependent variable the share of the care plan that is effectively consumed by
the individual, h∗it/h¯it (this is the ratio we call the “relative consumption”).
Empirically, we take the log of the ratio and estimate the following speci-
34Individualized income equals the individual’s monetary income when the beneficiary has no spouse
alive; it is equal to the household monetary income divided by 1.7 when the beneficiary has a spouse
alive. The consumption unit attributed to the second adult of the household follows the Oxford (or
“old OECD”) scale (OECD, 2013). Compared to the OECD-modified scale, which is nowadays the most
frequently used in France, the use of the Oxford scale to compute APA individualized income implies
that the economies of scale in a household with a disabled elderly are lower than in other households.
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fication:
ln
(
h∗it/h¯it
)
= γ˜0 + β˜1.ln(p
j
it) + (β˜1 + β˜2)ln(I
obs
it ) + β3.ln(h¯it)
+
2014∑
d=2002
ξ˜d.1dit + ζ˜ .1
e
it +X
′
it.θ˜ + λ˜t + ˜it (9)
The dependent variable is still censored when individuals fully consume
their care plan volume (exact volume or more), but the censoring point now
equals ln(h∗it/h¯it) = ln(1) = 0. It is the same for all beneficiaries, whatever
the volume of the care plan. Equation (9) is equivalent to:
ln(h∗it)− ln(h¯it) = γ˜0 + β˜1.ln(pjit) + (β˜1 + β˜2)ln(Iobsit ) + β˜3.ln(h¯it)
+
2014∑
d=2002
ξ˜d.1dit + ζ˜ .1
e
it +X
′
it.θ˜ + λ˜t + ˜it
ln(h∗i ) = γ˜0 + β˜1.ln(p
j
it) + (β˜1 + β˜2)ln(I
obs
it ) + (β˜3 + 1).ln(h¯it)
+
2014∑
d=2002
ξ˜d.1dit + ζ˜ .1
e
it +X
′
it.θ˜ + λ˜t + ˜it (10)
In Equation (9), β˜1 can thus be interpreted as the price elasticity of de-
mand. The equation presented in the previous section, Equation (8), is nested
in this equation. It would be equivalent to Equation (10) if we imposed the
constraint that β˜3 = −1.
The specification with relative consumption comes with several advantages.
First, it includes the care plan volume as a control, which might be a proxy of
the unobserved determinants of consumption. Second, relative consumption
is a better-behaved outcome than absolute consumption: its distribution is
closer to a normal (Figures B.1 and B.2) and the consistency of Tobit estimates
requires the normality of the error term. Finally, it enables us to overcome
the limitation of having an individual-specific censoring point: it eases the
implementation of the estimations.
[Figures B.1 and B.2 to be found on the following page]
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Figure B.1: Distribution of absolute home care consumption, by disability level
Sample: Estimation sample (data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014; 8,190 individuals).
Sub-sample size: N=1,145 in GIR 1 or 2 (most severe disability levels); N=1,655 in GIR
3; N=5,390 in GIR 4 (least severe disability level).
Notes: The “GIR” corresponds to the official disability level of APA beneficiaries. The
dashed vertical line indicates the pooled sample median value of home care consumption.
Figure B.2: Distribution of relative home care consumption, by disability level
Sample: Estimation sample (data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014; 8,190 individuals).
Sub-sample size: N=1,145 in GIR 1 or 2 (most severe disability levels); N=1,655 in GIR
3; N=5,390 in GIR 4 (least severe disability level).
Notes: Relative home care consumption designates the ratio hi/h¯i. The “GIR” corre-
sponds to the official disability level of APA beneficiaries. The solid vertical line at 1
indicates the censoring point of relative consumption.
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C MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION
The objective of this appendix is twofold. First, it provides the expres-
sion of the likelihood function we maximize to derive our baseline estimates
(Tobit estimation). Second, it shows that, within the framework proposed by
Moffitt (1986), the censoring of the measure of consumption at the kink and
beyond does not prevent the identification of the sample average price elastic-
ity of demand, conditional on some assumptions on the stability of individual
preferences.
To keep notations simple and concise, we ignore the time dimension (sub-
script t and year dummies are not included) and consider home care consump-
tion in level when deriving the likelihood function (while we include its log in
the empirical specification).
C.1 General setting
The demand for home care with the kinked budget constraint generated
by APA writes:
h∗i = g(cipi, Ii;Xi) + νi if h
∗
i < h¯i
g(pi, I˜i;Xi) + νi ≤ h¯i ≤ g(cipi, Ii;Xi) + νi if h∗i = h¯i
h∗i = g(pi, I˜i;Xi) + νi if h
∗
i > h¯i
(11)
with νi an individual preference shifter. We denote:
ψ a set of parameters characterizing the function g(.);
κ a set of parameters characterizing the distribution of the error term ν;
S1 the left-hand side segment of the budget constraint: i ∈ S1 ⇐⇒ h∗i < h¯i;
S2 the right-hand side segment of the budget constraint: i ∈ S2 ⇐⇒ h∗i > h¯i;
K the kink of the budget constraint: i ∈ K ⇐⇒ h∗i = h¯i.
C.2 Observational scheme with censoring
With hi the consumption in the data and h
∗
i the true consumption, our
observational scheme is:
hi =
{
h∗i if h
∗
i < h¯i
h¯i if h
∗
i ≥ h¯i
(12)
From Systems 11 and 12, we know that:
34
Pay less, consume more? Roquebert and Tenand
1. For all individuals i such that hi < h¯i, we know that hi = h
∗
i ; thus we
have h∗i < h¯i (i ∈ S1):
hi = g(cipi, Ii;Xi) + νi < h¯i
2. For individuals i such that hi = h¯i, we know that h
∗
i ≥ h¯i; these individ-
uals can be split in two different sub-groups:
(a) Individuals i such that h∗i = h¯i (i ∈ K); then:{
g(cipi, Ii;Xi) + νi ≥ h¯i
g(pi, I˜i;Xi) + νi ≤ h¯i
(b) Individuals i such that h∗i > h¯i (i ∈ S2); then:{
g(cipi, Ii;Xi) + νi > h¯i
g(pi, I˜i;Xi) + νi > h¯i
Thus, all censored observations (i ∈ S2 or i ∈ K) have in common the fact
that:
g(cipi, Ii;Xi) + νi ≥ h¯i
We can thus write:
hi =
{
g(cipi, Ii;Xi) + νi if g(cipi, Ii;Xi) + νi < h¯i
h¯i if g(cipi, Ii;Xi) + νi ≥ h¯i
(13)
which corresponds to the usual censored regression model setting.
The individual contributions to the likelihood function are derived from
this setting. Denote f(.|ci, pi, Ii, h¯i, Xi) the conditional density function of ν
and F (.|ci, pi, Ii, h¯i, Xi) its conditional cumulative distribution function. Then
the likelihood function writes:
L(ψ, κ) =
n∏
i=1
[
f
(
hi − g(cipi, Ii;Xi)|ci, pi, Ii, h¯i, Xi
)]I[hi<h¯i]
×
[(
1− F(h¯i − g(cipi, Ii;Xi)|ci, pi, Ii, h¯i, Xi))]I[hi=h¯i]
In our setting, the censoring of the dependent variable exactly at the kink
prevents us from distinguishing between the individuals who consume exactly
at the kink and those who actually locate on the right-hand side segment of the
budget constraint. Interestingly, it does not prevent the identification of our
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parameters of interest (which relate to function g(.)), although it comes at a
cost in terms of precision. Assuming some stability of individual preferences,35
we can interpret the price elasticity estimated using information relating to
the left-hand side of the kink as the price sensitivity of demand along the
entire budget constraint.
Weaker assumptions on individual preferences would not undermine the
identification of the price sensitivity for the selected sample of APA bene-
ficiaries consuming less than their care plan volume. However, if the un-
derlying data generating process actually changes at the kink, censored re-
gression methods would not adequately correct for the bias induced by the
non-observability of the individuals consuming at the kink or beyond.
C.3 Likelihood of our sample
As explained in Section 4.2 of the paper, we assumed the following speci-
fication for the demand for home care:36
ln(h∗i ) = γ0 + β1.ln(p
j
i ) + (β1 + β2).ln(Ii) +X
′
i.θ + i
We assume a normal distribution for the idiosyncratic shock :
 | p, I,X ∼ N (0, σ2)
Our likelihood function thus writes:
L(β, γ, θ, σ) =
n∏
i=1
[ 1
σ
φ
( ln(hi)− γ0 − β1.ln(pji )− (β1 + β2).ln(Ii)−X ′i.θ
σ
)]I[hi<h¯i]
×
[(
1− Φ( ln(h¯i)− γ0 − β1.ln(pji )− (β1 + β2).ln(Ii)−X ′i.θ
σ
))]I[hi=h¯i]
where φ(.) (resp. Φ(.)) the conditional density (resp. cumulative distribution)
function of a standardized normal variable.
When using the specification with the relative consumption, we have:
ln
(
h∗i /h¯i
)
= γ˜0 + β˜1.ln(p
j
i ) + (β˜1 + β˜2).ln(Ii) + β˜3.ln(h¯i) +X
′
i.θ˜ + ˜i
35 Moffitt (1986) assumes the functional form of g(.) is invariant to changes in consumer price and
income.
36Again, for the sake simplicity, we do not include in the expressions provided in this Appendix the
full set of dummies we actually include in our specifications to control for both the unobserved increase
in income and the legal relationship between the co-payment rate and disposable income (see Appendix
B.1).
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Similarly, we assume a normal distribution for the idiosyncratic shock ˜:
˜ | p, I,X, h¯ ∼ N (0, σ˜2)
The likelihood function writes:
L˜(β˜, γ˜, θ˜, σ˜) =
n∏
i=1
[ 1
σ˜
φ
( ln(h∗i /h¯i)− γ˜0 − β˜1.ln(pji )− (β˜1 + β˜2).ln(Ii)− β˜3.ln(h¯i)−X ′i.θ˜
σ˜
)]I[hi/h¯i<1]
×
[(
1− Φ( ln(h∗i /h¯i)− γ˜0 − β˜1.ln(pji )− (β˜1 + β˜2).ln(Ii)− β˜3.ln(h¯i)−X ′i.θ˜
σ˜
))]I[hi/h¯i=1]
Consistent estimators of β1, β2 and θ (respectively of β˜1, β˜2, β˜3 and θ˜) can be
derived as the arguments of the maximization of the log-likelihood function,
provided it is concave.37
In order to derive the likelihood function when taking the log-absolute
consumption as the dependent variable, we must assume the censoring point
h¯i does not depend on the error term, i. In other words, the individual
censoring point is assumed to be exogenous, conditional on the observable
variables. This assumption is discussed in the next Section and is not needed
when we take the log-relative consumption as the dependent variable.
37Similarly, though with a little more work, we could derive the likelihood function of the IV-Tobit
model. In the version we estimate (using Stata command ivtobit), the error terms of the first-stage and
second-stage equations are assumed to be jointly normally distributed.
37
Pay less, consume more? Roquebert and Tenand
D DETERMINANTS OF THE CARE PLAN
VOLUME AND CENSORING
When taking the log-absolute consumption as the dependent variable, the
Maximum Likelihood function (Appendix C) is derived assuming the individ-
ual censoring point, defined by h¯i, is exogenous conditional on explanatory
variables. In addition, consistency of estimates relies on the additional as-
sumption that the provider price pij is exogenous. When estimating Equation
(7) (Appendix B.1), one particular concern is that the provider price and the
care plan volume are correlated even conditional on the control variables.
These two assumptions - exogeneity of the censoring point and no system-
atic conditional relationship between the care plan volume and the provider
price - are relaxed when we take the log-relative consumption as the depen-
dent variable. This Appendix nonetheless discusses the plausibility of these
assumptions, by presenting elements on the establishing of the care plan vol-
ume and additional empirical material.
When setting the care plan volume h¯i, the evaluation team supposedly
takes into account the needs of the beneficiary in terms of assistance with
the activities of daily living. By law, the care plan volume should depend on
the administrative disability group. Gender and age (which we control for)
may influence the care plan volume, as they correlate with unobserved health
problems and housekeeping skills. Additionally, even tough matrimonial sta-
tus and family structure are not supposed to influence the care plan volume,
anecdotal evidence suggests that the evaluation team takes into account the
possible assistance regularly provided by relatives when establishing the care
plan.
Additionally, h¯i could directly relate to the price of the chosen provider in
a specific case: when the evaluation team sets the personalized care plan, it
has to check that the monetary equivalent of the care plan volume is below
the legal ceiling associated with the disability level of the beneficiary. In the
case care is provided by an authorized provider, the monetary equivalent of the
care plan equals the number of hours granted by the evaluation team times the
provider price. If the monetary equivalent of the care plan volume is higher
than the legal ceiling, the adjustment will go through a reduction in h¯i or the
choice of a cheaper provider. This may be a source of price endogeneity in
both (absolute and relative consumption) specifications.38
38Yet it should remain limited: for 7% of our sample at most, the monetary equivalent of their care
38
Pay less, consume more? Roquebert and Tenand
Empirically, once controlling for income, gender, age, disability group, mat-
rimonial status and professional care received on weekends, we find a small
positive correlation between the (OOP or provider) price and the volume of
the care plan, but the effect is not statistically significant.39 Then, a pro-
bit estimation of the probability to be censored, P(hi = h¯i), shows that the
probability to be censored slightly correlates with the price. A e1 increase
in the provider price is predicted to increase the probability to be censored
by 2 pp. (as a reminder, the sample censoring rate is around 40% and the
standard-deviation in provider prices is of e1.3).
Although they are statistically significant, these effects are small in prac-
tical terms. In addition, they fade out when we restrict our attention to ben-
eficiaries living in a municipality where only one provider is operating. This
suggests that the strategic choice of a provider (price) to comply with the legal
ceiling is empirically negligible in this sub-sample (see Appendix G.3).
The probability to be censored is higher for individuals with no part-
ner at home, possibly because individuals living with a partner benefit from
economies of scale in home care utilization40 and from informal help provided
by their spouse. Consuming the care plan volume totally is also more likely
for individuals who are entitled to subsidies on formal care served during the
weekends.
Individual observable characteristics explain about 50% of the variations
observed in the care plan volume. This leaves a large share of the variations
unexplained. Ethnographic work suggests that unobserved informal care or
health status can influence the evaluation team in the set up of the care plan
volume (Billaud et al., 2012).
As we do not have any good instrument to test the endogenity of the
care plan volume in our dataset, we have to rely on the assumption that it is
reasonably exogenous when estimating the specification with log-absolute con-
sumption as the dependent variable. This is one of the reasons why we favour
the specification with the relative consumption (Equation (9), Appendix B.2).
plan volume would exceed their legal ceiling if they choose the most expensive provider operating in their
municipality.
39In the panel analysis, we include fixed effects and cluster at the individual level. Table of results is
not included but is available upon request.
40These economies of scale are not factored in by the evaluation team when setting the care plan
volume. This is consistent with the fact that APA is meant to be a personal subsidy: legal ceilings do
not depend on whether a beneficiary has a partner also receiving APA.
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E THE HOME CARE SECTOR IN FRANCE
E.1 Three main types of home care providers
Home care to the disabled elderly can be provided by three types of providers:
(1) Authorized structures (services autorise´s), which must receive a special
authorization granted by the Departmental Council to enter the market;
their price is fixed by the Departmental Council.
(2) Non-authorized structures (services agre´e´s non autorise´s) are allowed to
provide home care services to APA beneficiaries under lighter conditions
than authorized structures; they are free to set their price (with some
restrictions on yearly price evolution being set at the departmental level).
(3) Over-the-counter workers (gre´-a`-gre´ ou mandataire): the beneficiary di-
rectly contracts with a home care worker. The beneficiary is free to set
her employee’s hourly wage provided she complies with general labor law.
There is no regulation for over-the-counter workers. Both authorized and
non-authorized structures have to meet quality standards, though require-
ments are higher for authorized structures. The existence of differences in
quality between authorized providers is less clear-cut. From a theoretical
prospective though, the uncertainties regarding the quality of services in the
home care sector lead to rule out vertical differentiation through prices (Mes-
saoudi, 2012).
In our empirical analysis, we focus on authorized providers: technically,
we are able to compute the exact OOP price of their customers receiving
APA as these services are priced by the Departmental Council. More broadly,
APA subsidized professional care is mainly provided by this type of struc-
ture: using a survey conducted on the French departments (LEDa-LEGOS
and CES, 2012), Hege et al. (2014) document that in over 45% of (respond-
ing) departments, more than two thirds of APA home care hours are provided
by authorized services. Care provided by authorized structures represent less
than one third of APA hours in only 15% of departments.41
41Using our data, we study the determinants of the choice of a provider. We find that individuals
receiving care from an authorized provider are on average less rich than the overall population of APA
beneficiaries; they tend to be younger, less disabled and live more often alone (results available upon
request).
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E.2 The different status for authorized providers
Authorized providers can be either public, for-profit or non-profit. Histor-
ically, in France, non-profit organizations were important providers of home
care and they remain predominant in most rural areas. In our department, 5
authorized providers are non-profit, providing care to about 54% of our estima-
tion sample in October 2014. 20 municipal services are providing care to APA
recipients (about 43% of the 2014 sample). For-profit structures represent a
small share of the authorized home care providers (3 in the department), as
they provide home care only to 3% of our 2014 sample.42
Theoretically, an APA beneficiary is free to choose her provider. In prac-
tice, the spatial coverage by the different types of authorized services is un-
equal over the territory. In some municipalities, several providers are found
to operate, while there is only one provider in others (see Section G.3). In
our department, among the beneficiaries living in a municipality where sev-
eral authorized providers serve APA recipients, more than 50% can choose
between the three types of authorized providers. These beneficiaries live in
relatively large municipalities: the supply mix is more diversified when there
is an important market for home care services, while small municipalities are
generally de facto served by a unique, non-profit structure. Conversely, the
typical supply mix in medium-size municipalities is the combination of non-
profit and public authorized providers. Finally, a for-profit provider is never
found to be the only authorized service operating in a given municipality.
42Proportions are similar in the pooled sample. The small market share of for-profit services among
authorized providers is not a specific feature of the department studied.
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F EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN PROVIDER
PRICES
F.1 Components of costs in the home care sector
In this section, we explain why customers may exogenously face different
provider prices, by detailing the components of prices in the home care sector.
Authorized providers are priced by the Departmental Council. The hourly
price of each provider, for one given year, should be set on the basis of the
overall average hourly production cost of the provider, of two years before. The
various components of production costs are described in qualitative studies,
either in academic works (Gramain and Xing, 2012) or in public reports.43
By order of importance (top-down), production costs can be decomposed as
follows:
• Workforce costs (80% of total charges): wages paid to professional care-
givers and, for a small part (around 10% of total charges), to the su-
pervising staff. The wage of a caregiver depends on her qualification,
according to collective labour agreements. We expect that the larger the
proportion of skilled caregivers, the higher the production cost and the
price. Wages are also augmented if employees work on Sunday or on
public holidays, in accordance with general labour legislation.
• Operating costs (10-15% of total charges): those include rents for the
service’s offices and other running expenses.
• Transportation costs (5-10% of total charges)44 correspond to the com-
pensation for the costs borne by employees to go to the consumer’s home.
This item is likely to vary largely across services according to their geo-
graphical area of intervention.
• Contrary to the health care sector, technological progress and capital
costs are negligible in the home care sector.
We represent the relationship between the provider price and several providers’
characteristics graphically.45 We distinguish between non-public (mainly non-
43There is, though, no national, comprehensive benchmark study on the costs of home care services.
Public reports regularly deplore the lack of information on costs as a major shortcoming preventing from
understanding the functioning of the sector (Vanlerenberghe and Watrin, 2014; Poletti, 2012).
44This item only includes the compensation of employees for the monetary costs associated with trans-
port. The ongoing study mentioned in the paper additionally takes into account the unproductive hours
spent on transports by the employees that are paid by the provider.
45We explore here other characteristics than the number of served municipalities, that we use as an
instrument for the price. The empirical relationship between the two variables is documented by Figure
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profit) providers and public providers. The latest are likely to receive grants
or advantages (e.g., a free office) from local municipalities that reduce operat-
ing costs. Such advantages are taken into account in the pricing process done
by the Departmental Council and lower down the regulated price of public
providers. In the graphical representation, we exclude the largest provider
of the department, a nationwide non-profit organization, which has system-
atically the highest values for the variables we are here interested in (see
Appendix ??).
In Figure F.1, provider prices are plotted against the number of APA ben-
eficiaries served by the service. Graphically, the more customers the provider
has, the higher its price. Having more customers might be associated with
more municipalities to serve (see discussion in Section 4.4 of the paper) or more
unproductive hours.46 This graph should be interpreted cautiously though: we
only know the number of APA recipients served by each home care provider,
instead of the total number of customers (including non-APA beneficiaries,
like other elderly or disabled individuals) served in the department.
Figure F.2 shows the relationship between the provider price and the share
of hours they serve on Sundays or on public holidays. Public providers have
a very low share of such hours, as most public services do not operate on
weekends and holidays. A higher share of hours made on holidays is associated
with a higher price among public structures, which is consistent with the
financial compensation of employees for working on public holidays.
[Table F.2 to be found on the following page]
2 in the paper.
46Unproductive hours (meetings, training) may become relatively more numerous when a service gets
relatively large.
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Figure F.1: Provider price according to the number of APA beneficiaries served by the
provider, by legal status
Sample: Authorized providers of the department serving at least
one APA beneficiary in October 2012, 2013 or 2014.
Notes: The largest provider, which serves 43% of the APA benefi-
ciaries receiving care from an authorized provider in the department
in 2014, is not included.
Figure F.2: Provider price according to the share of hours served on Sundays and public
holidays, by legal status
Sample: Authorized providers of the department serving at least
one APA beneficiary in October 2012, 2013 or 2014.
Notes: The largest provider, which has 1.80% of its home care hours
provided on Sundays and holidays in 2014, is not included.
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F.2 Correlations between individual characteristics and
provider price
We also investigate the importance of the observable characteristics on
the choice of a given level of provider price. Table F.I presents the individual
characteristics associated with the choice of a “low-price” authorized provider,
defined as a provider charging a price strictly below the average price charged
by the authorized providers operating in the beneficiary’s municipality (in a
given month). We estimate the probability of choosing a “low-price” provider
by a Probit on the sub-sample of individuals who live in a municipality where
several authorized providers serve APA recipients. Beyond a slight age effect,
only the disability level is found to have a significant impact. The least severely
disabled are more likely to choose a “low-price” provider, possibly reflecting
that they perceive home care as less necessary and are thus ex ante more
sensitive to its price. Income is not found to have any impact on this choice,
nor is matrimonial status (Fisher tests reject the joint significance of both the
set of income quartile dummies and the set of matrimonial status dummies).47
[Table F.I to be found on the following page]
47Although we do not find any evidence that beneficiaries who are able to choose between different
authorized providers choose a price level according to their income, it might still be the case that there
is systematic correlation between income and provider price in the sample, as about 30% of beneficiaries
are suspected not to be able to choose between different providers (Appendix G.3). When we take our
estimation sample and regress the provider price on income and all the socio-demographic variables we
include in our estimations as well as year dummies, we find a negative partial correlation between income
and provider price. Although it is statistically significant, it is fairly small: a one standard-deviation
increase in disposable income is predicted to decrease provider price by 0.01 standard-deviation. This is
small enough not to undermine the separate identification of the price and empirical income elasticities.
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Table F.I: Individual characteristics associated with the choice of a low provider price
Dependent variable: chooses a “low-price” provider
(1)
Income quartile: 1 -0.010
(0.025)
Income quartile: 2 Ref.
Income quartile: 3 -0.003
(0.028)
Income quartile: 4 -0.006
(0.029)
Woman -0.030
(0.019)
aAge: 60-69 -0.050
(0.054)
Age: 70-79 -0.040∗
(0.021)
Age: 80-89 Ref.
Age: 90 or more -0.029
(0.021)
Disability level: 1 (most severe) -0.102
(0.113)
Disability level: 2 -0.024
(0.036)
Disability level: 3 Ref.
Disability level: 4 (least severe) 0.068∗∗∗
(0.022)
Lives with no spouse -0.000
(0.021)
Spouse receives APA 0.004
(0.051)
Lives with non-APA spouse Ref.
Spouse in institution -0.098
(0.110)
Observations 5701
Number of clusters 82
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipal-
ity level; ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Estimation of a Probit
model by Maximum Likelihood. Average partial effects (APE) are
displayed. “Low-price” providers are charging a price below the av-
erage price of authorized providers within a given municipality (in
one given month: October 2012, 2013 or 2014); the estimation uses
the sample of beneficiaries served by only an authorized provider liv-
ing in a municipality where at least two different prices are offered
by authorized providers. Data pooled from October 2012, October
2013 and October 2014. Specifications include year fixed effects.
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G ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
G.1 Additional results: absolute or relative consump-
tion
In this section, we present the results obtained on the pooled sample and
by year, fitting several specifications. Table G.I presents the estimates of the
first specification, when the dependent variable is the absolute consumption
(Equation (7), Appendix B.1). Tables G.II and Table G.III present the results
obtained with the second specification, when the dependent variable is the
relative consumption, either assuming the provider price is exogenous (Table
G.II) or instrumenting it (Table G.III). In all three tables, Column (1) gives
the estimate obtained on the pooled sample, while Columns (2) to (4) display
the estimates obtained on October 2012, 2013 or 2014.
Whatever the specification, estimates on 2014 are of a lower precision,
essentially because there is one provider less (one provider closed down in
2014). The point estimates are also systematically lower (in absolute value)
in 2014 than in the other two years, although the difference from one year to
the other is never statistically significant.
When the dependent variable is the absolute consumption, the coefficients
associated with the price lie between -0.7 and -1.0: they are higher than
those obtained with the relative consumption (between -0.3 and -0.7 with no
instrumentation, -0.1 and -0.5 when the IV strategy is implemented). It might
be explained by the fact that the care plan volume, which may be a proxy for
some unobserved determinants of professional care consumption, is not taken
into account in the specification with absolute consumption as the dependent
variable.
With the absolute consumption, the income effect within the APA scheme
is suggested to be negative. When taking the relative consumption as the
dependent variable, and including the care plan volume as a control, point
estimates are lower in absolute value (presumably because the omitted variable
bias is reduced); the effect of income within the APA scheme is no longer
significant. The IV-strategy only little affects point estimates. Except for
2014, we can systematically reject that the price elasticity is zero.
Overall, these results confirm that the price elasticity is significantly dif-
ferent from zero and inferior to one in absolute value. The -0.4 point estimate
we finally retain is the one that is the most likely to be unbiased (care plan
volume as a control & IV strategy) and the most precise (pooled data with
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both intra- and inter- individual price variations). Yet we must acknowledge
the relatively low precision of our results: the 95%-level confidence interval
derived from our favoured specification indicates a price elasticity between
-0.01 and -0.76.
[Tables G.I and G.II to be found on the following page;
Table G.III to be found on page 50]
Table G.I: Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours (absolute con-
sumption)
Dependent variable: absolute consumption h∗ (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012-14 2012 2013 2014
Price (log) -0.793∗∗∗ -0.977∗∗∗ -0.721∗∗ -0.709∗∗
(0.248) (0.260) (0.297) (0.290)
Disposable income (log) -0.039∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8190 2571 2757 2862
Censored observations 36.6% 40.4% 38.2% 40.2%
Number of clusters 28 28 28 27
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level; ∗ p <
0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014.
Estimation of a Tobit model by Maximum Likelihood. All specifications
include as controls socio-demographic variables, dummies for the year the
latest plan was decided upon and dummies for the year in which the co-
payment rate was computed. Column (1) additionally includes year fixed
effects.
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Table G.II: Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours (relative con-
sumption)
Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h¯ (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012-14 2012 2013 2014
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.670∗∗∗ -0.376 -0.300
(0.181) (0.180) (0.236) (0.238)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.003 -0.014 -0.014
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016)
Care plan volume (log) 0.040∗ 0.054∗ 0.019 0.041
(0.023) (0.030) (0.027) (0.033)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8190 2571 2757 2862
Censored observations 36.6% 40.4% 38.2% 40.2%
Number of clusters 28 28 28 27
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level;
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Data from October 2012, 2013
and 2014. Estimation of a Tobit model by Maximum Likelihood. All
specifications include as controls socio-demographic variables, dummies
for the year the latest plan was decided upon and dummies for the year
in which the co-payment rate was computed. Column (1) additionally
includes year fixed effects.
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Table G.III: Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours (relative con-
sumption, IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012-14 2012 2013 2014
Panel A: Second Stage Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h¯ (log)
Price (log) -0.387∗∗ -0.537∗∗ -0.460∗∗ -0.134
(0.192) (0.209) (0.214) (0.245)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.003 -0.014 -0.014
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016)
Care plan volume (log) 0.040∗ 0.054∗ 0.019 0.042
(0.023) (0.030) (0.028) (0.033)
Panel B: First Stage Dependent variable: provider price p (log)
Number of municipalities (std.) 0.049∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8190 2571 2757 2862
Censored observations 36.6% 40.4% 38.2% 40.2%
Number of clusters 28 28 28 27
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p <
0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014. Estimation of an IV-Tobit
model by Maximum Likelihood. Price is instrumented by the number of municipalities
served by the provider. In the first stage (Panel B), the log-provider price is regressed
on the standardized number of municipalities served by the provider. All specifications,
for both Panel A and Panel B, include as controls socio-demographic variables, dummies
for the year the latest plan was decided upon and dummies for the year in which the
co-payment rate was computed. Column (1) additionally includes year fixed effects.
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G.2 Clustering and Bootstrap inference
Level of clustering
In the paper, we denote ˜it the error term in our favoured specification
(Equation (5)). As we cluster at the provider level j, we actually implicitly
assume the following structure for the error term ˜:
˜ijt = ξ˜i + ν˜j + ζ˜ijt
with ξ˜i capturing the unobserved individual heterogeneity, and ν˜j the provider
level time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. For two individuals i and i′ that
are served by the same provider j (assume for the sake of simplicity that t is
not varying), corr(˜ijt, ˜i′jt) 6= 0 as long as there are unobserved shocks taking
place at the provider level.
For a given individual observed at t and t′, error terms will be necessarily
correlated if there is some individual time-invariant unobserved heterogene-
ity.48 As standard with panel data, we would need to cluster at the indi-
vidual level. Yet, as almost all APA beneficiaries keep the same provider j
over time, the latter way of clustering (at the individual level) is essentially
nested in the former clustering option (at the provider level). We believe that
within-individual correlation of errors is more important than within-provider
shock correlation; we nonetheless choose to cluster at the most aggregate level.
In our specific setting, in which our main explanatory variable varies at the
provider-year level, clustering at the provider level is of due caution as the
provider price does not change within one cluster cross-sectionally (Moulton,
1990; Cameron and Miller, 2015).
Inference with few clusters
With clustered standard errors, inference relies on asymptotic properties
that kick in as the number of clusters tends to infinity. The “few-cluster issue”
was documented notably by Cameron et al. (2008): in an OLS setting, Wald
hypothesis tests based on the standard cluster-robust estimate of the variance
matrix tend to over-reject the null. Rejection rates increase when clusters are
of unequal sizes (Imbens and Kolesa´r, 2015).
In our department, there are relatively few authorized providers (28 in 2012
48Note that we are not able to include individual fixed-effects in the type 1-Tobit model, as there is no
parametric solution to the incidental parameter problem (Lancaster, 2000).
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and 2013, 27 in 2014 as one provider closed down).49 and there is one very
large authorized provider (Figure G.1). This service is a local branch of a
long-standing nationwide non-profit home care service; it serves 37% of the
APA beneficiaries in our sample. With only 28 clusters, including one being
considerably larger than the others, we face the risk that standard cluster-
robust inference is biased.
Figure G.1: Distribution of the size of authorized providers (October 2014)
Notes: Size of a provider is measured by the number of APA benefi-
ciaries it serves. Data from October 2014, 27 authorized providers (one
authorized provider closed down in 2014).
In order to assess the robustness of the inference on the estimates presented
in the paper, we use a bootstrap procedure. By bootstrapping the Wald t-
statistic associated with the price elasticity estimate ˆ˜β1, we may improve small-
sample inference by attaining asymptotic refinement (Cameron and Miller,
2015).
We start by estimating our equation on the original sample (by Tobit or
IV-Tobit).50 We retrieve the point estimate of the price elasticity, βˆ1 and its
standard error, se( ˆ˜β1), and we compute the original sample Wald t-statistic
t = ˆ˜β1/se(
ˆ˜β1). We then implement a percentile pair cluster bootstrap, by
repeating 1,000 times the following steps:
49This is not a feature specific to our department though (LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012).
50Here, as well as in the subsequent bootstrap replications, we do not use Stata’s ivtobit command,
through which standard errors are derived using the observed information matrix (oim). Instead, we
first regress the (log) provider price on the instrument and the other exogenous controls (clustering at
the provider level) and derive a prediction of the log of the provider price. We run the second step by
regressing the (log) relative consumption on the predicted log-provider price and the other controls, again
clustering at the provider level. It gives the inputs we use in the bootstrap procedure.
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1. We form 28 “pair” clusters of observations by re-sampling with replace-
ment 28 times from the original clustered sample.
2. For each bootstrap sample b = 1, ..., 1000, we estimate ˆ˜βb1 (by Tobit or
IV-Tobit), and the associated cluster-robust standard error se( ˆ˜βb1).
3. For each bootstrap sample b, we compute the Wald t-statistic centered
in ˆ˜β1 :
tb =
ˆ˜βb1 − ˆ˜β1
se( ˆ˜βb1)
, b = 1, ..., 1000
We then use the empirical distribution of the bootstrap t-statistics tb to
derive the critical values to be used in lieu of the critical values derived from a
standard normal or T distribution. We compare the t-statistic associated with
the price elasticity coefficient obtained in the observed sample to the symmet-
rical critical values derived from the bootstrapped t-statistic distribution. The
percentile-t p-value for the symmetric two-sided Wald test of H0: “β˜1 = 0”
is computed as the proportion of times the absolute value of the boostrapped
t-statistic is greater than the absolute value of the observed sample t-statistic;
that is to say, the proportion of times that |tb| > |t|, b = 1, ..., 1000
Issues may arise when using pair cluster resampling with dummy control
variables: some of the bootstrap samples may have little or even no variation
in the control variables. The computation of tb in those samples is not possible;
using the bootstrap t-statistics that were actually computed is not an option
either, as completed replications cannot be assumed to be random.51 In order
to avoid failure to complete the target number of cluster bootstrap replications,
we drop from our original sample the 8 individuals whose co-payment rate was
last reassessed prior to 2011.52
Table G.IV displays the price elasticity estimates and compares standard
inference with bootstrap inference. Columns (1) to (3) display the estimates
obtained using a Tobit model to estimate our specification with relative con-
sumption, while Columns (4) to (6) are derived from an IV-Tobit estimation.
Columns (1) and (3) display the original consumer price elasticity estimates
obtained by either Tobit or IV-Tobit estimations, while Columns (2) and (5)
display the same estimates obtained on the sample on which the pair cluster
51Wild cluster bootstrap has been documented as leading to more robust inference in the case of few
clusters, as well as helping in the case that right-hand side dummy variables induce incomplete replications
(Cameron and Miller, 2015). To our knowledge though, wild cluster bootstrap has not been extended to
nonlinear models.
52Our specifications with absolute and relative consumptions include a dummy for the year in which
the co-payment rate was assessed, as justified in Appendix B.1.
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bootstrap can be completed. Comparing (1) and (2) first, then (4) and (5),
we see that dropping the 8 aforementioned individuals has virtually no effect
on the point estimate.
[Table G.IV to be found on the following page]
Table G.IV: Bootstrap inference
Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h¯ (log)
——— Tobit ——— ——— IV-Tobit ———
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.451∗∗ -0.451∗∗ -0.387∗∗ -0.388∗∗ -0.386∗∗
(se) (0.181) (0.180) - (0.192) (0.192) -
p-value 0.013 0.012 0.018 0.044 0.044 0.014
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(se) (0.007) (0.007) - (0.007) (0.007) -
p-value 0.184 0.184 0.163 0.186 0.186 0.165
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample All co-payment reassessed All co-payment reassessed
no earlier than 2011 no earlier than 2011
Observations 8190 8182 8182 8190 8182 8182
Censored observations 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6%
Inference Default Default Bootstrap Default Default Bootstrap
Number of clusters 28 28 28 28 28 28
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, the provider level; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Data pooled from October 2012, 2013 and 2014. Estimation of a Tobit or IV-Tobit model by
Maximum Likelihood (Stata commands tobit for Columns (1) to (3), and ivtobit for Columns (4)
and (5)). In Columns (3) and (6), inference is obtained using a bootstrap procedure. Difference in
the point estimates between Columns (5) and (6) is due to the fact that in Column (6) we implement
manually the IV strategy in two separate steps, rather than using the ivtobit command, to make
the Bootstrap procedure consistent.
Samples: In Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6), individuals whose co-payment rate was reassessed prior
to 2011 are not included in the sample (8 individuals).
Bootstrap inference: We implement a pair cluster percentile bootstrap of the t-statistics (1,000
replications). The percentile-t p-value for the symmetric two-sided Wald test of H0: β˜1 = 0, is
computed as the proportion of times the absolute value of the boostrap t-statistic is greater than
the absolute value of the observed sample t-statistic.
The Tobit estimation of the specification with the relative consumption
produces a t-stat equal to -2.50. The 25th lowest value of the bootstrap t-
statistics is -1.87, while its 975th is equal to 1.90. Using a symmetric Wald
test, we find that the absolute value of the original t-stat is larger than |tb|
a little less than 99% of times (p-value of 0.018, Column (3) of Table G.IV).
Bootstrap inference thus indicates that we can reject the hypothesis that the
price elasticity is zero at the 5% level.
Similarly, the IV-Tobit estimation of the specification with relative con-
sumption produces a t-stat equal to -1.93. The 25th lowest value of the boot-
strap t-statistics is -1.73, while its 975th is equal to 1.38. Using a symmetric
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Wald test, we reject the hypothesis that the relative consumption of home
care is price inelastic, again at the 5% level.
Figures G.2 and G.3 display the empirical distribution of the bootstrap
t-statistics obtained following either the Tobit or the IV-Tobit estimation of
the consumer price elasticity. We display a normal distribution with mean
and variance equal to the mean and variance of the empirical distribution
of the bootstrap t-statistics, and the normal distribution with mean 0 and
variance 1 as a benchmark. Despite the sample containing one very large
cluster, we observe a quite smooth distribution of t-statistics in both Figures.
All replications are complete and the tails of the distribution do not seem
excessively fat, making us confident in the quality of our bootstrap and in the
statistical power of the deriving Wald test on the price elasticity estimate.
Figure G.2: Percentile-t bootstrap quality: distribution of bootstrap t-statistics (Tobit
estimation)
Notes: t-stats from percentile bootstrap-t (1,000 replications). Output from
Tobit estimation on relative consumption (Column (3) of Table G.IV) on sam-
ple of 8,182 individuals. ∗The first normal distribution displayed has a mean
and variance equal to the mean and variance of the distribution of bootstrap
t-stats. Dashed vertical lines represent the 25th and 975th ordered elements
and the mean of the bootstrap t-stat distribution.
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Figure G.3: Percentile-t bootstrap quality: distribution of bootstrap t-statistics (IV-Tobit
estimation)
Notes: t-stats from percentile bootstrap-t (1,000 replications). Output from
manual IV-Tobit estimation on relative consumption (Column (6) of Table
G.IV) on sample of 8,182 individuals. ∗The first normal distribution displayed
has a mean and variance equal to the mean and variance of the distribution of
bootstrap t-stats. Dashed vertical lines represent the 25th and 975th ordered
elements and the mean of the bootstrap t-stat distribution.
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G.3 Alternative identification strategy: using single-
provider areas
Single-provider and multiple-provider areas
According to their geographical location in the department, beneficiaries
may not be systematically able to choose between several providers of the
department. We divide our sample into two sub-populations (Figure G.4):
on the one side, beneficiaries living in a municipality where a single provider
is found to operate, or single-provider area (denoted “SPA”; areas in plain
color). On the other side, individuals living in a municipality where two or
more authorized providers have customers, or multiple-provider area (denoted
“non-SPA”; dotted areas).53
Figure G.4: Distribution of providers in the department - Schematic representation
Notes: We provide only a schematic representation to preserve the anonymity
of the department. Different shades of plain grey indicate different areas served
by a unique authorized service (single-provider areas, or SPA), each being
served by a different provider with a given price level. The dotted areas corre-
spond to multiple-provider (non-SPA) municipalities.
As displayed in Table G.V, 79% of the municipalities represented in our
sample belong to an SPA; 35% of beneficiaries included in the estimation sam-
53To identify the two types of areas, we use the full population of APA beneficiaries in the department,
not only the APA beneficiaries of our estimation sample.
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ple live in this type of areas. The remaining beneficiaries live in a municipality
where two or more authorized providers have customers. This partition in-
terestingly reflects the spatial concentration of the APA population: 65% of
the beneficiaries in our sample live in 21% of the department municipalities.
Consistently, non-SPA municipalities are more often urban centers than SPA
municipalities.
Table G.V: Single-provider areas and multiple-provider areas (October 2014)
Municipalities Beneficiaries Average
price
Number Frequencies Number Frequencies
SPA 220 78.9% 995 34.8% e22.7
Non-SPA 59 21.1% 1,867 65.2% e22.0
Total 279 100% 2,862 100% -
Notes: Estimation sample from October 2014. Average provider price per type of area
is not weighted by the number of customers of the providers.
The spatial distribution of professional care provision is consistent with the
fact that transportation costs are an important factor in the provision decision
of home care services (cf. Section 4.4 of the paper). Providing services all
over the department would be costly for a relatively small service. Typically,
municipalities where only one provider is found to operate are served by non-
profit home care services. In urban centers, the supply proposed by non-profit
services may be complemented with municipal home care services, or even, in
the largest municipalities, with one of the few for-profit authorized services
found in the department (cf. Appendix E.2).
Table G.VI presents the descriptive statistics computed on the two sub-
samples of APA beneficiaries, depending on the type of area in which they
live. The two sub-samples are similar in terms of their socio-demographic
characteristics albeit non-SPA residents are richer on average. This is con-
sistent with the fact that non-SPA residents tend to locate in urban centers.
The under-consumption rate is higher among non-SPA beneficiaries, but the
average number of hours effectively subsidized is similar in both types of areas.
This goes against the concern that SPA beneficiaries may experience rationing
in the provision of professional care. Although subsidized consumption rela-
tive to the care plan volume is slightly higher for SPA beneficiaries on average
(86% versus 84%), the overall distribution of relative consumption is fairly
similar in the two sub-samples. Overall, except for the income level, the two
populations little differ in terms of outcome and explaining variables.
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Table G.VI: Descriptive statistics on the two sub-samples (SPA/non-SPA, October 2014)
SPA Non-SPA Difference
(p-value)
Variable [1] [2] [1] - [2]
Care plan volume [a] 20.1 20.8 0.06
Care plan monetary value [b] e456.8 e454.8 0.83
Hours effectively subsidized [c] 17.5 17.8 0.38
Amount of effective subsidies [d] e311.7 e294.9 0.03
[c] inferior to [a] 57.2% 61.2% 0.03
Individualized income e1,272 e1,339 0.00
co-payment rate 21.9% 24.6% 0.00
Provider price e22.8 e21.8 0.00
Hourly out-of-pocket price e5.0 e5.4 0.01
Total OOP payments e86.0 e94.2 0.03
on subsidized hours
Age 84.4 84.0 0.18
Women 72.5% 74.7% 0.18
Disability level 1 (most severe) 1.5% 1.0 %
0.54
Disability level 2 12.2% 12.6%
Disability level 3 20.7% 19.1%
Disability level 4 (least severe) 65.6% 67.3%
100% 100%
Living with a spouse 34.7% 33.3%
0.81Living alone 64.7% 66.1%
Spouse in institution 0.6% 0.6%
100% 100%
Number of individuals 995 1867 -
Number of households 965 1820 -
Notes: Estimation sample from October 2014. Descriptive statistics are computed on the
sub-sample of APA beneficiaries living in single-provider municipalities (SPA) in Column (1)
and those living in multiple-provider municipalities (non-SPA) in Column (2). Compared to
Table G.V, average provider price in each sub-sample is weighted by the number of beneficiaries
in the sample.
Tests: Last column presents the p-values associated with the tests of difference between SPA
and non-SPA beneficiaries. Test performed is a Student (resp. a Pearson χ2) for binary or
continuous (resp. categorical) variables.
Price elasticity estimates using SPA and non-SPA beneficiaries
Arguably, SPA beneficiaries have limited choice if they resort to an autho-
rized provider. As a consequence, they are not able to choose their price pji .
Note that home care price endogeneity due to residential mobility is suggested
to be negligible: the overall residential mobility of the elderly is very low (La-
ferre`re, 2008) and when moves occur, they are mainly explained by family
motives or the need for adapted residences. Price endogeneity should thus
be limited in the SPA sub-sample; on the contrary, we suspect it may arise
in the non-SPA sample. Comparing the price elasticity estimates obtained
on the two sub-samples may thus provide a test of price endogeneity in the
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estimation sample.
The estimation is run using the specification with the relative consump-
tion, the outcome being h∗it/h¯it. Results are displayed in Table G.VII.
54 As
presented in the paper, the price elasticity is of -0.45 when estimated on the
whole sample, significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Restricting the
sample to individuals who are assumed to have no provider choice, the point
estimate slightly changes to -0.52. Because of reduced sample size and price
variations, precision is lower but the estimate is still significantly different from
zero at the 10% level.
The point estimate is higher when we run the estimation on the sub-
population of individuals who can choose between different providers, with
a point value of -0.63. The difference between the two sub-sample estimates
might potentially be explained by both an omitted variable bias affecting the
choice of the provider price and some differences in the characteristics of the
individuals of the two samples. However, the difference is not statistically
significant even at the 10% level. Overall, this alternative estimation strategy
(relying on SPA beneficiaries only) confirms our main results: the consump-
tion of home care by the disabled elderly is price-elastic, with a point estimate
inferior to one in absolute value and a magnitude seemingly around -0.5 or
-0.4.
54We only display the price and income coefficients as the effects of controls are similar to the estimates
obtained with the full estimation sample (displayed in Table II of the paper).
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Table G.VII: Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours (SPA/non-
SPA)
Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h¯ (log)
Sample: All SPA Non-SPA
(1) (2) (3)
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.522∗ -0.626∗∗
(0.181) (0.305) (0.258)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 0.001 -0.013
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
Care plan volume (log) 0.040∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.049∗
(0.023) (0.014) (0.029)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8190 2489 5701
Censored observations 39.6% 40.7% 39.1%
Number of clusters 28 18 28
AIC 11454 3277.318 8144
BIC 11643 3376.252 8324
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level;
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Pooled data from October 2012, 2013,
2014. Estimation of a Tobit model by Maximum Likelihood. All specifications
include as controls sociodemographic variables, dummies for the year the latest
plan was decided upon, dummies for the year in which the co-payment rate
was computed and year fixed effects. SPA stands for “single-provider area”
beneficiaries, non-SPA for “multiple-provider area” beneficiaries.
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This alternative identification strategy has several drawbacks. First, focus-
ing on SPA beneficiaries induces additional intra-departmental selection. We
find the non-SPA to be richer than SPA beneficiaries. If richer individuals are
more price-elastic, as suggested by Table III in the main text, the price elastic-
ity obtained on the SPA sub-sample would then be a lower bound (in absolute
value) for the average price elasticity of our estimation sample. But we may
additionally suspect that the two sub-samples differ in terms of unobservable
determinants of professional care consumption. Using the specification with
relative consumption, we tested the effect of including a dummy equal to one
for SPA beneficiaries (Table G.VIII): living in a SPA is found to positively
affect home care relative consumption, ceteris paribus. The inclusion of the
SPA dummy affects the price elasticity estimate (although not statistically
significantly). This might suggest that SPA beneficiaries behave differently
than non-SPA in terms of care consumption decisions.
[Table G.VIII to be found on the following page]
One might fear that authorized providers operating as monopolies may
set their price in accordance with the price elasticity of demand. In SPA
municipalities, provider prices could be higher where the price sensitivity of
APA beneficiaries is lower, inducing a potential downward bias (in absolute
value) in our point elasticity estimate. Given that the authorized providers
operating in an SPA are systematically non-profit structures and that they
are priced by the Departmental Council, there is limited scope for consumer
surplus extraction by monopolist providers.
A more serious issue a priori is that SPA and non-SPA sub-samples are
constructed using the available information of our sample. We construct the
non-SPA sample by observing the municipalities in which there are beneficia-
ries served by at least two different authorized providers.55 It might be the
case, especially in very small municipalities, that there are few beneficiaries
living in a municipalities and they happen to all choose the same provider. In
this case, we will infer that there is only one provider operating; we do not
have any other way to infer from the data whether the individuals were able
to choose between different providers. Although such cases are scarce,56 we
should remain cautious when interpreting the price elasticity estimated on the
SPA sample.
55We do not have direct information on the supply and geographical coverage by the different providers.
568% municipalities turn out to have a unique APA beneficiary, hosting 1% of the department’s benefi-
ciaries. More largely, beneficiaries living in municipalities with 5 or less APA recipients represent around
10% of total beneficiaries.
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Finally, when focusing on SPA beneficiaries, we loose 10 clusters (corre-
sponding to authorized providers who are only found to operate jointly with
other providers in the municipalities where they are present). This may un-
dermine the validity of inference in the SPA sub-sample.
Table G.VIII: Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours, controlling
for the type of area of residence
Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h¯ (log)
(1) (2)
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.613∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.202)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.008
(0.008) (0.007)
Lives in a SPA 0.064∗∗∗
(0.023)
Other controls Yes Yes
Observations 8190 8190
Censored observations 36.9% 36.9%
Number of clusters 28 28
AIC 11454 11431
BIC 11644 11621
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider
level; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Pooled data from Octo-
ber 2012, 2013 and 2014. Estimation of a Tobit model by Maximum
Likelihood. Specifications include as controls sociodemographic vari-
ables, dummies for the year the latest plan was decided upon, dum-
mies for the year in which the co-payment rate was computed and
year fixed effects. SPA stands for “single-provider area”, non-SPA
for “multiple-provider area” beneficiaries.
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G.4 Additional results: sensitivity to the inclusion of
care received on weekends
As we do not directly observe the informal care received by the individuals,
we include as a control in our estimation the formal home care the individual
possibly receives during the weekend and public holidays (Table G.IX).
As in our baseline estimations, the latent dependent variable is the number
of hours consumed between Monday and Saturday, except for public holidays,
divided by the care plan volume open for business days. Consistently, the
care plan volume taken into account to compute relative consumption only
includes the hours that were prescribed to be consumed over the week. APA
beneficiaries may also be entitled to subsidies for a few hours of care to be
received during weekends and public holidays, which are set separately in the
personalized care plan. Although weekend hours are charged the same price,
they are not fungible with week hours. Only 7.5% of our estimation sample has
weekend hours included in her personalized care plan, for a median volume of
about 5 hours a month.57 We did not include the home care hours received on
weekends as a control in our baseline specifications because of a simultaneity
concern.
We hypothesize that, for given disability and socio-demographic character-
istics, individuals not receiving professional home care over the weekend are
more likely to receive assistance from their relatives. We find that receiving
formal care during the weekend is associated with more hours consumed dur-
ing working days; reassuringly though, it does not significantly affect the price
elasticity estimate.
[Table G.IX to be found on the following page]
57As beneficiaries with weekend care plan volume tend to be more severely disabled, their week care
plan volume, h¯it, is on average higher than the week care plan volume of the rest of beneficiaries. Among
these beneficiaries, APA hours prescribed on weekends amount only to 15% of the week care plan volume
on average.
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Table G.IX: Inclusion of home care received on weekends
Dependent variable: relative consumption during the week h∗i /h¯i (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Price (log) -0.392∗∗ -0.452∗∗ -0.392∗∗
(0.193) (0.195) (0.196)
Consumes care on weekends 0.227∗∗∗ -0.054
(0.020) (0.054)
Number of hours received on weekends 0.080∗∗∗
(0.017)
Observations 8,190 8,190 8,190
Censored observations 39.6% 39.6% 39.6%
Number of clusters 28 28 28
AIC -22073.724 -22168.783 -22215.301
BIC -21884.435 -21979.495 -22026.013
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Pooled data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014 (population-
average model). Estimation of an IV-Tobit model by Maximum Likelihood. Provider
price is instrumented by the number of municipalities served by the provider. All
specifications, in both the first and second stages, include as controls the care plan
volume, sociodemographic variables, dummies for the year the latest plan was de-
cided upon, dummies for the year in which the co-payment rate was computed and
year fixed effects.
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G.5 Robustness check: estimation by a truncated re-
gression model
As a further robustness check, we estimate the price sensitivity of the
demand for home care using a truncated regression model. We make as if we
did not observe all individuals who consume beyond their care plan volume.
A first estimation attempt based on our preferred specification (Equation
(9)) was made. Unfortunately, the maximum likelihood is found to have dis-
continuous regions with missing values and no estimate could be derived.58
As an alternative, we took the relative consumption, hi/h¯i, as the dependent
variable. Convergence is achieved. As shown in Table G.X, the truncated
regression model gives a price coefficient very close to what the censored re-
gression model does. As we exploit less information when fitting a truncation
model (on about 40% of the sample), the precision is much lower. Although
the coefficient on income is higher in when using a truncated regression model,
this comparison gives credit to the econometric specification of the model. It
gives empirical support to the theoretical discussion presented in Appendix
C.2: under an assumption of stability of preferences and constant price elas-
ticity along the demand curve, we are able identify the sample average price
elasticity by using information on the individuals that locate on the left-hand
side of the kink in the budget constraint.
58The maximum likelihood function of a truncated regression model is a ratio; as the algorithms behind
the truncreg command in Stata use analytic derivatives, we hypothesize that the estimation failure is
due to the fact that the denominator of the maximum likelihood function (the cumulative distribution
function of a Normal) gets too close to zero when taking the log-relative consumption as the dependent
variable.
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Table G.X: Consumer price elasticity estimations: comparing truncated and censored
regression models.
Dependent variable: relative consumption (h/h¯)
(1) (2)
Truncated reg. Censored reg.
Price (log) -0.304 -0.275∗∗
(0.449) (0.111)
Disposable income (log) -0.076∗∗∗ -0.007∗
(0.027) (0.004)
Observations 4947 8190
Clusters 28.000 28.000
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level; ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Pooled data from October 2012, 2013
and 2014. Estimation of a Truncated regression model and a Tobit model
by Maximum Likelihood. Specifications include as controls sociodemo-
graphic variables, dummies for the year the latest plan was decided upon,
dummies for the year in which the co-payment rate was computed and
year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the relative consumption,
not in ratio.
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